Canadian privacy & access decisions

The complaint concerned 411Numbers, an operator of websites providing free access to telephone numbers and associated information, including unlisted numbers, and formerly charging a fee for removal. The complainant alleged collection without consent, use for an inappropriate purpose (paid removal), over-collection of information for removal services, and unresponsiveness to privacy queries. The OPC asserted jurisdiction over 411Numbers due to a 'real and substantial connection' to Canada, despite its Hong Kong incorporation. The OPC found that 411Numbers contravened Principle 4.3 by publishing unlisted numbers without consent, as they are not 'publicly available' under the Regulations. The practice of charging for removal ceased during the investigation, resolving that aspect, though the OPC noted it would likely be an inappropriate purpose. The OPC also found contraventions of Principle 4.3.3 for over-collecting identification for removal requests and Principles 4.1, 4.1.2, 4.1.4, 4.8, and 4.10 regarding accountability, openness, and challenging compliance. Based on 411Numbers' commitments to remove unlisted data, improve due diligence, and enhance its privacy practices, the matter was deemed well-founded and conditionally resolved.

• Whether the OPC had jurisdiction over 411Numbers, a Hong Kong-incorporated company with servers outside Canada, due to a 'real and substantial connection' to Canada.
• Whether 411Numbers collected, used, and disclosed the complainant's personal information (unlisted phone number, name, address) without knowledge and consent, contravening Principle 4.3.
• Whether information associated with unlisted telephone numbers constitutes 'publicly available' information under paragraph 1(a) of the Regulations Specifying Publicly Available Information.
• Whether 411Numbers exercised due diligence to ensure its databases did not include unlisted numbers.
• Whether publishing personal information for the purpose of encouraging individuals to pay to have it removed constitutes an inappropriate purpose under s. 5(3) of PIPEDA.
• Whether 411Numbers required individuals to provide more information than necessary for removal services, contravening Principle 4.3.3.
• Whether 411Numbers met its obligations regarding accountability under Principles 4.1, 4.1.2, and 4.1.4.
• Whether 411Numbers met its obligations regarding openness under Principle 4.8 and 4.8.3.
• Whether 411Numbers met its obligations regarding challenging compliance under Principle 4.10.

The complainant, an air passenger rights advocate, requested access to all records about himself held by the Canadian Transportation Agency (CTA). The CTA initially withheld 760 pages, arguing that most references to the complainant's name were not personal information because he was acting on behalf of an organization. The OPC found that the information was indeed personal information, as the organization was not a separate legal entity and the records contained views and information directly about the complainant. The OPC also found that the CTA incorrectly applied exemptions under section 26 (third-party personal information) and subsection 70(1) (cabinet confidences) in some instances, and over-redacted under section 27 (solicitor-client privilege). The complaint was found to be well-founded, and the CTA agreed to implement the OPC's recommendations to disclose the withheld information.

• Whether information relating to the complainant's advocacy activities, where his name appears, constitutes personal information under section 3 of the Privacy Act
• Whether the CTA correctly invoked paragraph 12(1)(b) to deny access to information it deemed not to be personal information
• Whether the CTA correctly withheld third-party personal information under section 26 of the Privacy Act
• Whether the CTA correctly withheld information under section 27 of the Privacy Act (solicitor-client privilege)
• Whether the CTA correctly withheld information under subsection 70(1) of the Privacy Act (cabinet confidences)

The complainant alleged that Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada (ISED) used inaccurate personal information about him when staffing a position. ISED acknowledged that its Human Resources officials mistakenly selected the complainant's profile in the MyGCHR system instead of another individual with the same name, leading to the complainant being 'hired' by ISED and 'terminated' from his position at Public Services and Procurement Canada (PSPC). This error caused the complainant to miss pay periods. The OPC found that ISED did not take all reasonable steps to ensure the accuracy of the personal information, as officials only used first and last names for the search and did not verify with additional identifiers like a Personal Record Identifier (PRI) or date of birth. The complaint was found to be well-founded, but ISED has since implemented a new policy requiring staff to validate identities using multiple data fields.

• Whether the information at issue constituted personal information under section 3 of the Privacy Act
• Whether ISED took all reasonable steps to ensure that the personal information it used for an administrative purpose was as accurate, up-to-date and complete as possible, as required by subsection 6(2) of the Privacy Act

An anonymous complainant raised concerns that Microsoft Windows 10 defaulted several privacy settings to "on" during installation, and these settings were difficult to understand and change. The OPC investigated whether Microsoft obtained valid consent for collecting, using, and disclosing personal information via these default settings. Initial concerns about clarity and consistency were shared with Microsoft regarding the original Windows 10 version. Following the Creators Update, the OPC identified further issues, particularly regarding the meaningfulness of consent for Location, Diagnostics, Tailored Experiences, Relevant Ads, and Speech Recognition settings, noting confusion caused by conflating related practices. Microsoft cooperated and committed to implementing changes, including obtaining opt-in consent for all installation privacy settings, enhancing transparency, and correcting the functioning of Speech Recognition. The OPC found the complaint well-founded and conditionally resolved, pending Microsoft's implementation of these commitments by the end of 2018.

• Whether Microsoft obtained valid and meaningful consent for the collection, use, and disclosure of personal information through Windows 10 default privacy settings.
• Whether the initial Windows 10 (Version 1507) installation process provided sufficient prominence for customizing settings and adequate information via "Learn more" links.
• Whether the explanations for Advertising ID and Diagnostics settings in Version 1507 were clear, consistent, and comprehensive.
• Whether opt-out consent was appropriate for the Location setting in the Creators Update, and if Microsoft's explanations were sufficiently transparent regarding exceptions and the use of "de-identified location information."
• Whether "Full" Diagnostics should be the default setting, and if Microsoft's transparency regarding data collected at this level was adequate for meaningful consent.
• Whether Microsoft obtained valid consent for Tailored Experiences, particularly concerning the use of broad diagnostic data and the protection of sensitive information.
• Whether Microsoft's practices for Tailored Experiences complied with accountability requirements under Principle 4.1.4.
• Whether opt-out consent was appropriate for the Relevant Ads (Advertising ID) setting, and if Microsoft's communications clearly distinguished it from its own advertising program.
• Whether opt-out consent was appropriate for the Speech Recognition setting, given the sensitivity of voice data and its cloud-based nature.
• Whether Microsoft's explanations for Speech Recognition clearly distinguished between cloud-based and device-based functionality.
• Whether Microsoft consistently respected user choices regarding the Speech Recognition setting, especially when conflicting with Cortana settings.

Multiple complainants alleged that Profile Technology Ltd. copied their personal information from Facebook profiles and groups without consent and posted it on its social networking website, making removal difficult, and indefinitely retaining helpdesk information. The OPC asserted jurisdiction over the New Zealand-based company due to a real and substantial connection to Canada. The OPC found that the information was not "publicly available" under PIPEDA's Regulations, and Profile Technology failed to obtain valid consent for its new purpose of operating a social networking site. Furthermore, the OPC determined that using this information for such a purpose was not appropriate in the circumstances and that the indefinite retention of helpdesk ticket information violated retention principles. Profile Technology refused to implement recommendations for deletion and a retention policy. Although the company later removed profiles from its website, it uploaded much of the data to the Internet Archive, which the OPC found did not resolve the contraventions and created new privacy risks. The matter was found to be well-founded.

• Whether the OPC had jurisdiction to investigate a New Zealand-based company's activities affecting Canadians.
• Whether the investigation was time-barred under subsection 13(1) of PIPEDA.
• Whether PIPEDA's application to commercial activity is constitutionally valid under the federal Trade and Commerce power.
• Whether personal information copied from Facebook profiles was "publicly available" under PIPEDA's Regulations Specifying Publicly Available Information.
• Whether Facebook profiles constitute a "publication" for the purposes of the Regulations.
• Whether Profile Technology obtained valid knowledge and consent (Principle 4.3 PIPEDA) for the collection, use, and disclosure of personal information for its social networking website.
• Whether consent obtained by Facebook was sufficient for Profile Technology's subsequent use of the data.
• Whether opt-out consent would be an appropriate form of consent in this context (Principle 4.3.4 PIPEDA).
• Whether Profile Technology's use of Facebook profile information for its social networking site was for purposes a reasonable person would consider "appropriate in the circumstances" (subsection 5(3) PIPEDA).
• Whether Profile Technology retained personal information (helpdesk tickets) longer than necessary (Principle 4.5 PIPEDA).
• Whether Profile Technology was responsible for personal information held by its third-party helpdesk service provider.
• Whether Profile Technology's actions of removing profiles from its website and uploading data to the Internet Archive resolved the identified contraventions.

A federal inmate complained that Correctional Service Canada (CSC) repeatedly denied him access to his personal information, specifically video and audio recordings, in contravention of the Privacy Act. This complaint followed a similar investigation in 2012 where the OPC found serious deficiencies in CSC's handling of the complainant's requests, including failure to retain video recordings before destruction. In the current investigation, the OPC found that CSC again failed to retrieve and retain requested video recordings within their short retention period in two cases, and failed to respond to four other requests for grievance-related records. The OPC concluded that CSC contravened subsection 12(1) of the Privacy Act by denying the complainant access to his personal information. CSC accepted the OPC's recommendations to improve its processes for handling access requests for records with short retention periods and to respond to outstanding requests.

• Whether CSC contravened subsection 6(1) of the Privacy Act by failing to retain personal information for a prescribed period
• Whether CSC contravened subsection 12(1) of the Privacy Act by failing to provide access to personal information
• Whether CSC contravened subsection 16(3) of the Privacy Act by failing to respond to access requests within statutory time limits
• Whether CSC appropriately applied paragraph 22(1)(c) of the Privacy Act to withhold video recordings
• Whether CSC appropriately applied section 26 of the Privacy Act to withhold video recordings
• Whether CSC made reasonable efforts to secure video recordings before destruction as per previous OPC recommendations
• Whether CSC's processes for handling access requests for records with short retention periods are adequate

The OPC received complaints alleging that Correctional Service Canada (CSC) contravened the Privacy Act by intercepting cell phone conversations and text messages near Warkworth Institution. CSC confirmed intercepting six text messages but denied recording conversations, stating it did not intend to collect text messages. The investigation found that CSC used a cell-site simulator, operated by a contractor, to detect unauthorized cell phone use by inmates. While the collection of metadata was deemed consistent with the Act due to security concerns, the interception of text message content was not authorized. The OPC concluded that CSC was responsible for the contractor's actions and that the collection of text messages contravened the Privacy Act. The complaints were found to be well-founded.

• Whether cell phone metadata constitutes personal information under the Privacy Act
• Whether text messages constitute personal information under the Privacy Act
• Whether the collection of cell phone metadata by CSC was consistent with section 4 of the Privacy Act
• Whether the interception and collection of text message content by CSC was consistent with section 4 of the Privacy Act
• Whether CSC is responsible for the actions of its contractor in collecting personal information

The complaint alleged that the Department of National Defence (DND) improperly disclosed deceased Canadian Forces (CF) members’ medical records to Military Police (MP) investigators for "sudden death suicide investigations" under paragraph 8(2)(e) of the Privacy Act, without due consideration for necessity. Complainants argued that CF-NIS investigations should be limited to determining if wounds were self-inflicted, not broader medical history. DND contended that its Directorate of Access to Information and Privacy (DAIP) was not required to "look behind" facially valid requests, and that the lawfulness of an investigation was the responsibility of the investigative body. The Office of the Privacy Commissioner (OPC) found the allegation that DND failed to properly assess the necessity of the information sought under s. 8(2)(e) to be not well-founded, concluding that DAIP generally exercised sufficient scrutiny. However, the OPC also found that DND failed to meet its obligations under subsection 8(4) of the Privacy Act and section 7 of the Privacy Regulations by not retaining copies of 8(2)(e) request forms in several cases and lacking comprehensive records of disclosures. This constituted a well-founded finding regarding DND's recordkeeping practices. The OPC recommended DND update its policies to ensure retention of all request forms, confirmation of statutory authority for investigations, and maintenance of comprehensive disclosure records. DND committed to implementing these recommendations within six months.

• Whether DND's Directorate of Access to Information and Privacy (DAIP) improperly granted full access to deceased Canadian Forces (CF) members’ medical records under paragraph 8(2)(e) of the Privacy Act.
• Whether the DAIP gave due consideration to the necessity of the requested records for the investigation.
• Whether CF-NIS requests for medical records were permissible under paragraph 8(2)(e) given their internal policies limiting the scope of suicide investigations.
• Whether DND's recordkeeping practices for 8(2)(e) requests and disclosures were consistent with subsection 8(4) of the Privacy Act and section 7 of the Privacy Regulations.
• Whether the DAIP should verify the statutory authority under which an investigative body's lawful investigation is being conducted, in line with the TBS Directive.

The Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada (OPC) investigated a complaint against Facebook Inc. following a 2013 privacy breach where contact information, including that of non-users, was inadvertently disclosed via the 'Download Your Information' (DYI) tool. The investigation focused on Facebook's safeguards, consent practices for its 'matching across address books' process for both users and non-users, and the ability for individuals to access and correct their personal information. The OPC found Facebook's safeguards inadequate prior to the breach, but deemed the issue resolved after Facebook implemented a new Privacy Framework. While Facebook's use of user contact information for matching was found not to contravene consent principles, the OPC determined Facebook was not sufficiently open about these practices, an issue conditionally resolved by Facebook's commitment to revise its notices. The OPC also found Facebook used non-users' personal information for matching without meaningful consent, an issue resolved by Facebook's agreement to stop maintaining such data. Finally, Facebook was found not to be providing adequate access to and correction of matched data, which was resolved through an interim solution.

• Whether FB had appropriate safeguards in place prior to the breach to protect contact information of users and non-users.
• Whether FB implemented appropriate safeguards after the breach.
• Whether FB was using the personal information of users and non-users during the process of matching across address books.
• Whether FB was obtaining meaningful consent from users for the use of personal information during the matching process.
• Whether FB was meeting its obligation to be open about its policies and practices regarding the matching process for users.
• Whether FB was obtaining meaningful consent from non-users for the use of personal information during the matching process.
• Whether FB was providing users and non-users the ability to obtain access to their personal information/data.
• Whether FB was providing users and non-users the ability to correct their personal information/data.
• Whether the breach resulted in unauthorized disclosure of personal information.
• Whether the testing conducted by FB for the DYI tool was adequate.
• Whether the notice provided to non-users in email invitations was consistent with PIPEDA s.6.1 and Principles 4.3 and 4.8.
• Whether providing access to matched data would likely reveal personal information about a third party under PIPEDA s.9(1).
• Whether providing access to matched data would raise safety and security concerns.

Four complaints were filed against Transport Canada (TC) regarding its Interim Order requiring owners of unmanned aircraft (drones) to display their name, address, and telephone number on the device. Complainants argued this contravened the disclosure provisions of the Privacy Act by forcing public exposure of personal information without consent, and raised concerns about harassment or identity theft. TC stated the Interim Order was an interim measure to address significant safety risks posed by recreational drone users, citing a 200% increase in incidents since 2014. The OPC determined that while the information is personal, the requirement does not constitute a 'collection' of personal information by TC under sections 4 and 5 of the Privacy Act, and thus the disclosure provisions of section 8 do not apply. The OPC found no violation of the Act but noted TC's commitment to rework identification requirements in future regulations to address privacy concerns.

• Whether the requirement to display personal information on unmanned aircraft constitutes a collection of personal information by Transport Canada under sections 4 and 5 of the Privacy Act
• Whether the disclosure provisions of section 8 of the Privacy Act apply to the personal information displayed on unmanned aircraft as per the Interim Order
• Whether the Interim Order contravenes the Privacy Act by obligating individuals to expose personal information to the public without consent

An anonymous complainant alleged that Statistics Canada (StatCan) improperly disclosed confidential census information to Shared Services Canada (SSC) when it transferred its informatics infrastructure, contravening the Statistics Act and risking unauthorized disclosure. The complainant raised concerns about StatCan's supervision over SSC employees, the storage of data in shared data centers, and the potential for disclosure during decryption. StatCan argued that SSC took over infrastructure, not data, and that SSC employees with access were 'deemed employees' under the Statistics Act, sworn to confidentiality, and subject to high security clearances. The Office of the Privacy Commissioner (OPC) found that StatCan was legally required to use SSC's services and, under section 16 of the Shared Services Canada Act, StatCan retained control and accountability for the data. The OPC concluded that StatCan took reasonable measures, including comprehensive agreements and security assessments, to define its relationship with SSC and protect the census data. Therefore, the complaint was deemed not well-founded.

• Whether Statistics Canada improperly disclosed confidential census information to Shared Services Canada by transferring its informatics infrastructure.
• Whether the sharing of census information with SSC contravenes the Statistics Act.
• Whether Statistics Canada maintains sufficient supervision over SSC employees accessing census data.
• Whether the storage of census data in SSC data centers shared with other federal institutions creates a risk of unauthorized disclosure.
• Whether there is a risk of disclosure of confidential census data when it is decrypted for processing.
• Whether Statistics Canada has taken sufficient steps to oversee SSC’s handling of census data on its behalf, consistent with its obligations under the Privacy Act.
• Whether the transfer of personal information by StatCan to SSC for IT infrastructure services is authorized by the SSCA and consistent with the Privacy Act.
• Whether StatCan has implemented appropriate privacy protection clauses and safeguards in its agreements with SSC.
• Whether SSC employees with access to confidential census data have been properly sworn in as "deemed employees" under the Statistics Act.

A complainant alleged that a courier company disclosed her personal information without consent by delivering a package containing financial documents to her neighbour. The courier company's policy allowed drivers to deliver packages to neighbours if the addressee was not home, a practice the complainant was unaware of as she was not expecting the package. The OPC found that the courier company contravened Principle 4.3 of PIPEDA by failing to obtain consent for this practice, either directly from the complainant or by ensuring the shipper had obtained it. The OPC noted that the sensitivity of the package's contents and the complainant's unlisted phone number on the label heightened the need for express consent. The courier company committed to ending the 'delivery to a neighbour' practice in response to the OPC's recommendations. The OPC later confirmed the practice had ceased.

• Whether the courier company obtained valid consent for delivering a package to a neighbour
• Whether the courier company exercised due diligence to ensure the shipper obtained consent for 'delivery to a neighbour'
• Whether the information disclosed (name, address, unlisted telephone number, and package contents) was sensitive in context

The complainant, representing over twenty physicians, alleged that Health Canada's Non-Insured Health Benefits (NIHB) Program collected more personal information than necessary for adjudicating drug benefit claims for First Nations and Inuit people. Specifically, the complaint focused on the detailed patient information required for the approval of Limited Use drug benefits. Health Canada maintained that it only collects information essential for providing drug benefits, with data fields based on clinical criteria defined by expert drug-review committees. The OPC reviewed submissions from both parties and consulted with the physicians, focusing on a representative sample of Limited Use forms. The investigation concluded that Health Canada demonstrated a direct connection between the information collected and the purpose of collection, and that the information was necessary for administering the NIHB Program. Consequently, this aspect of the complaint was found to be not well-founded.

• Whether the information collected by Health Canada on Limited Use forms for drug benefits constitutes personal information under the Privacy Act
• Whether Health Canada's collection of personal information on Limited Use forms relates directly to an operating program or activity of the institution as required by section 4 of the Privacy Act
• Whether the specific data fields requesting detailed diagnostic information (e.g., exact number of swollen joints) are necessary for the adjudication of drug benefit claims under the NIHB Program

The Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada (OPC) initiated an investigation into the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) following a 2016 data breach of its Anti-Doping Administration and Management System (ADAMS) by the "Fancy Bear" hacking group. The breach led to the public disclosure of highly sensitive personal and health information of 127 athletes, with 11,837 athletes' data potentially accessible. The OPC examined whether WADA had sufficient security safeguards under PIPEDA Principles 4.1.4, 4.7, 4.7.1, 4.7.2, and 4.7.3. The investigation found WADA's safeguards to be insufficient, particularly concerning access controls, monitoring, policies, and encryption, given the sensitivity of the data and the sophisticated nature of the attack. WADA agreed to implement most of the OPC's recommendations, including developing a comprehensive information security framework, strengthening access controls, and employing encryption at rest. The OPC accepted WADA's proposal for optional two-factor authentication for athletes, provided WADA actively promotes its use. Consequently, the matter was concluded as well-founded and conditionally resolved, with the OPC entering into a compliance agreement to monitor WADA's implementation.

• Whether WADA's security safeguards were appropriate to the sensitivity of the personal information in ADAMS, as required by PIPEDA Principles 4.7, 4.7.1, 4.7.2, and 4.7.3.
• Whether WADA had implemented adequate policies and practices to give effect to PIPEDA principles, including procedures for protecting personal information, staff training, and policy documentation, under Principle 4.1.4.
• Whether WADA's access controls, including password management, multi-factor authentication, and oversight of administrative accounts granted to Anti-Doping Organizations (ADOs), were sufficiently robust.
• Whether WADA's monitoring and logging capabilities were adequate to detect and respond to security anomalies and intrusions.
• Whether WADA had a proper incident response plan and a documented risk-management framework.
• Whether WADA employed encryption for data at rest in the ADAMS database.
• Whether WADA provided sufficient security awareness training to its staff and ADAMS stakeholders.

An anonymous complainant challenged an online marketplace's privacy practices after receiving an advocacy email without explicit consent. The complaint alleged unauthorized use of personal information for lobbying, inadequate handling of her privacy complaint, and unnecessary retention of data. The OPC found that the retention allegation was not well-founded. However, the OPC determined that the online marketplace failed to obtain adequate consent for sending advocacy emails and mishandled the complainant's privacy concerns, contravening PIPEDA Principles 4.3 and 4.10 respectively. The organization initially committed to corrective measures, including updating its privacy policy, providing an opt-out for advocacy messages, and improving its complaint handling process. Following the successful implementation of these recommendations, the OPC deemed the consent and challenging compliance matters well-founded and resolved.

• Whether the online marketplace obtained valid consent under PIPEDA Principle 4.3 for using email addresses to send advocacy emails.
• Whether the online marketplace adequately explained the purposes for using personal information such that the individual could reasonably understand how it would be used (PIPEDA Principle 4.3.2).
• Whether the form of consent obtained was appropriate given the reasonable expectations of the individual and the sensitivity of the information (PIPEDA Principles 4.3.4, 4.3.5, 4.3.6).
• Whether the online marketplace enabled the complainant to address concerns to the designated individual accountable for PIPEDA compliance (PIPEDA Principle 4.10).
• Whether the online marketplace implemented policies and practices to receive and respond to complaints and trained staff (PIPEDA Principles 4.1.4(b), 4.1.4(c)).
• Whether the online marketplace retained personal information longer than necessary for the identified purpose (PIPEDA Principle 4.5).