Canadian privacy & access decisions

The complainant alleged that the Privy Council Office (PCO) failed to respond to an access request within the statutory time limits. The request sought minutes of the Joint Intelligence Committee from 1957 to 1958. PCO claimed an extension, partly for consultations with other government institutions. When these consultations were not completed by the deadline, PCO closed the file, citing a "no late file" policy and the absence of recommendations from consulted institutions. The Office of the Information Commissioner found that the Access to Information Act does not permit an institution to close a file or fail to respond due to outstanding consultations. Consequently, PCO was deemed to be in refusal under subsection 10(3) of the Act. The Commissioner recommended that PCO respond to the request and revise its policy to comply with the Act. PCO did not implement the recommendations.

• Whether the institution responded to the access request within the time limits set out in the Access to Information Act
• Whether an institution can close an access request file due to outstanding consultations with other government institutions
• Whether the institution was in deemed refusal pursuant to subsection 10(3) of the Act

The complainant alleged that the Privy Council Office (PCO) failed to respond to an access to information request within the statutory time limits. The request, submitted in July 2016, sought records related to assistance for the 2016 Alberta fire disaster, involving approximately 9,100 pages. PCO initially claimed a 120-day extension but then put the request on indefinite hold for consultations, a practice not permitted by the Act. Despite the Information Commissioner's recommendation to provide a final response by June 1, 2020, PCO failed to meet this deadline, citing ongoing consultations and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. The Commissioner found the complaint to be well founded, noting that PCO was deemed to have refused access due to the delay. However, due to the complaint's filing date, the Commissioner lacked the authority to issue a binding order for disclosure.

• Whether the institution responded to the access request within the time limits set out in the Access to Information Act
• Whether the institution's indefinite 'hold' for consultations is permissible under the Act
• Whether the institution was deemed to have refused access under subsection 10(3) due to delay

The complainant alleged that the Department of Justice Canada (Justice) failed to respond to an access request within the statutory time limits. The OIC had previously investigated a complaint regarding the same request and recommended a response by December 15, 2019. Justice did not accept this recommendation but committed to disclosing the records by April 27, 2020. When Justice failed to meet this extended deadline, a new complaint was filed. The Commissioner found that Justice was deemed to have refused access under subsection 10(3) of the Act due to its failure to provide records within the prescribed timeframes. Consequently, the complaint was found to be well founded, and Justice was ordered to respond to the access request by September 30, 2020.

• Whether the institution failed to respond to an access request within the time limits set out in the Act
• Whether the institution was deemed to have refused access pursuant to subsection 10(3) of the Act

An individual complained that the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority (CATSA) contravened the Privacy Act by collecting and disclosing his personal information to police after finding legal medical cannabis during a security screening. The complainant argued that CATSA's mandate is aviation security, not general law enforcement, and that cannabis is not a prohibited item. CATSA maintained that its actions were incidental to its mandate and in the public interest, consistent with its regulator's direction. The OPC found that CATSA lacked the legal authority under section 4 of the Privacy Act to collect personal information for general law enforcement purposes related to cannabis, as cannabis is not on the Prohibited Items List and does not pose an aviation security threat. Similarly, the OPC concluded that the disclosure of this personal information to police was not consistent with section 8 of the Privacy Act. However, the OPC found CATSA's practice of destroying records related to such searches to be consistent with section 6 of the Act. The OPC recommended that CATSA cease unauthorized collection and disclosure of personal information related to cannabis and destroy any existing records, which CATSA agreed to implement.

• Whether the collection of personal information from travellers found to be in possession of cannabis is consistent with section 4 of the Privacy Act
• Whether the disclosure of the personal information of travellers found to be in possession of cannabis is consistent with section 8 of the Privacy Act
• Whether CATSA’s record retention practices in terms of the personal information collected from travellers found to be in possession of cannabis are consistent with section 6 of the Privacy Act

Three individuals complained about the Royal Canadian Mounted Police's (RCMP) use of non-conviction information in vulnerable sector (VS) checks, which they required for employment or volunteer positions. The complainants alleged that the RCMP inappropriately used non-criminal information, including mental health incidents, without proper consent. The OPC found that for two of the complaints, the RCMP contravened section 7 of the Privacy Act because the consent forms did not clearly inform applicants about the types of non-conviction information that would be used. While the RCMP argued consent was obtained, the OPC determined it was not informed consent in these cases. The OPC also concluded that the RCMP's broad policy of reporting non-conviction information, including mental health incidents, was not proportional or minimally intrusive compared to more restrictive provincial models. However, the complaint regarding the RCMP's retention period for personal information was found not well-founded, as it complied with the minimum requirements of the Privacy Regulations. The RCMP agreed to revise its consent forms and policy to address the OPC's concerns, leading to a well-founded and conditionally resolved outcome for the two complaints.

• Whether the use of non-conviction information by the RCMP for VS checks was done with informed consent consistent with section 7 of the Privacy Act.
• Whether the RCMP's policy of reporting non-conviction information broadly, including mental health incidents, in VS checks was proportional or minimally intrusive.
• Whether the RCMP should amend its policies with respect to the use of non-conviction information in VS checks.
• Whether the RCMP contravened the Act by retaining Complainant 2’s personal information for too long.

The Office of the Privacy Commissioner (OPC) investigated complaints from federal public servants regarding an improper disclosure of their pay-related information by Public Services and Procurement Canada (PSPC). PSPC inadvertently sent personnel overpayment reports containing personal information of 69,087 public servants to the wrong government institutions. The OPC found that PSPC contravened section 8 of the Privacy Act by disclosing personal information without authorization. However, the complaints were deemed resolved due to PSPC's corrective actions, which included implementing new procedures with quality controls for report generation, requesting deletion of the flawed reports, and notifying affected individuals. The OPC noted that while notification was timely, some departments modified the notification letters, leading to inconsistencies in the information received by individuals.

• Whether PSPC improperly disclosed personal information in contravention of section 8 of the Privacy Act
• Whether the information disclosed constituted 'personal information' under section 3 of the Privacy Act
• Whether PSPC's response to the breach, including mitigation and notification, was adequate
• Whether PSPC implemented sufficient measures to prevent recurrence of the breach

The OPC investigated a complaint regarding the unauthorized disclosure of personal information about Supreme Court candidate Chief Justice Glenn Joyal. Media reports claimed an anonymous source revealed a disagreement between the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) and the former Attorney General over Joyal's nomination. The complainant alleged breaches of the Privacy Act by the Privy Council Office (PCO), Department of Justice (DOJ), Office of the Commissioner of Federal Judicial Affairs (CFJA), and the PMO. The OPC determined it lacked jurisdiction over the CFJA and PMO, focusing its investigation on the PCO and DOJ. The investigation found no evidence that either the PCO or the DOJ had access to the specific information that was leaked, nor that the disclosure originated from these institutions. While no contravention was found, the OPC highlighted that Chief Justice Joyal's privacy was compromised and called for legislative reform to extend the Privacy Act's coverage to all government institutions, including Ministers' Offices and the PMO.

• Whether the Office of the Commissioner of Federal Judicial Affairs (CFJA) is a 'government institution' under the Privacy Act
• Whether the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) is a 'government institution' under the Privacy Act
• Whether the Privy Council Office (PCO) was responsible for the unauthorized disclosure of Chief Justice Joyal's personal information under section 8 of the Privacy Act
• Whether the Department of Justice (DOJ) was responsible for the unauthorized disclosure of Chief Justice Joyal's personal information under section 8 of the Privacy Act

A former employee of TD Canada Trust complained that TD outsourced fraud claims processing to a third-party service provider in India without obtaining customer consent or offering an opt-out. The complainant also alleged that TD was not sufficiently open about this practice. The Office of the Privacy Commissioner (OPC) also investigated whether TD maintained accountability by ensuring a comparable level of protection for personal information transferred to the third party. The OPC found that TD was not required to obtain additional consent, as the information was used for the original purpose of fraud claims management for which consent was already obtained. Furthermore, TD was deemed sufficiently open, providing clear information about transfers to foreign jurisdictions in its account agreements and privacy resources. The OPC concluded that TD ensured a comparable level of protection through a robust contract, comprehensive risk assessments, employee controls, cybersecurity measures, and proactive monitoring. Consequently, all aspects of the complaint were found to be not well-founded.

• Whether TD was required to obtain additional consent for transferring personal information to a third-party service provider in India for fraud claims processing (Principle 4.3 PIPEDA)
• Whether TD was required to offer customers an opt-out for the transfer of personal information to a third-party service provider in India for fraud claims processing
• Whether TD was sufficiently open about its practice of transferring personal information to a third-party service provider in a foreign jurisdiction for processing (Principle 4.8 PIPEDA)
• Whether TD ensured a comparable level of protection for personal information processed by the third-party service provider in India (Principle 4.1.3 PIPEDA)

The complainant alleged that the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) contravened the Privacy Act by disclosing his personal medical information to his bondsperson. The CBSA had carbon copied the bondsperson on a letter containing details about the complainant's health changes while in CBSA detention. The CBSA argued that the information was publicly available because the complainant had included the same medical information in court documents as part of his litigation. The OPC found that the medical information was indeed publicly available in court records, making section 8 of the Privacy Act inapplicable under subsection 69(2). Therefore, the complaint was found to be not well-founded. The OPC noted that had the information not been publicly available, the disclosure would likely have constituted a breach of the Act, as the CBSA's operational bulletin did not sufficiently authorize the disclosure.

• Did the CBSA disclose the complainant’s personal information?
• Was any disclosed information “publicly available”, such that subsection 69(2) of the Act excludes application of sections 7 and 8?
• If not, was the disclosure permitted under subsection 8(2) of the Act?

Two Dell customers complained to the OPC after receiving "tech support scam" calls where fraudsters possessed their personal Dell product information, alleging insufficient security safeguards and inadequate complaint handling by Dell. The OPC's investigation revealed that two employees of Dell's service provider in India had sold customer data lists in June and November 2017, affecting at least 7,883 Canadians. The OPC found Dell responsible for the personal information, concluding that its safeguards related to access controls, logging, monitoring, and technical measures were insufficient given the data's sensitivity and the high-risk environment. Dell also failed to adequately investigate the June 2017 breach and respond to customer complaints. Following the OPC's recommendations, Dell implemented numerous enhancements, including changing service providers, improving security protocols, and revising complaint handling procedures. Consequently, the OPC deemed the matter well-founded and resolved.

• Whether Dell adequately safeguarded personal information under its control while using a service provider (PIPEDA Principle 4.1.3 and 4.7).
• Whether the personal information transferred to the service provider was sensitive enough to require a high degree of protection.
• Whether Dell's access controls were sufficient to protect customer information.
• Whether Dell's logging and monitoring practices were adequate to detect anomalous employee requests for customer information.
• Whether Dell's technical measures, such as USB drive restrictions, were sufficient.
• Whether Dell adequately investigated the circumstances and scope of the June 2017 breach.
• Whether Dell adequately responded to customer complaints about potential privacy breaches (PIPEDA Principle 4.10.4).
• Whether Dell remained responsible for personal information transferred to a third party for processing.

A dentist complained that RateMDs.com, a health practitioner ratings website, used her personal information without consent, contravening PIPEDA Principle 4.3. The complaint concerned both her business contact information and user-generated reviews and ratings about her practice. The OPC found that the business contact information was publicly available, thus not requiring consent for its collection, use, and disclosure. Regarding the reviews, the OPC acknowledged they were personal information for both the dentist and the reviewers, requiring a balancing of interests, and concluded that the public interest in informing patient decisions outweighed the dentist's lack of consent, deeming this aspect not well-founded. However, RateMDs' explanation of its accuracy and correction policies was found to lack clarity, contravening the Openness Principle, which RateMDs resolved by updating its terms. Crucially, the OPC found RateMDs' "pay-for-takedown" service, which allowed subscribers to hide negative reviews for a fee, to be an inappropriate practice under s.5(3) of PIPEDA, a "no-go zone." RateMDs agreed to cease offering this feature, leading to a conditionally resolved finding for this issue.

• Whether RateMDs collected, used, or disclosed the complainant's business contact information without consent (Principle 4.3)
• Whether the business contact information exemption under s.4.01 of PIPEDA applied to RateMDs' use of the complainant's business contact information
• Whether the complainant's business contact information was publicly available under s.7(1)(d), 7(2)(c.1), and 7(3)(h.1) of PIPEDA and its Regulations
• Whether the reviews and ratings posted on RateMDs constituted the complainant's personal information
• Whether the reviews and ratings also constituted the personal information of the users who posted them
• Whether RateMDs required the complainant's consent to publish the reviews and ratings about her (Principle 4.3)
• Whether a balancing of interests was required when the privacy rights of multiple individuals conflicted regarding the same personal information
• Whether RateMDs ensured the accuracy of information and provided a fair and accessible process for health professionals to challenge and correct inaccurate information (Principle 4.6, 4.9.5)
• Whether RateMDs made readily available specific information about its policies and practices relating to the management of personal information, particularly regarding review removal and correction (Principle 4.8)
• Whether RateMDs' "pay-for-takedown" service, allowing subscribers to hide negative reviews for a fee, constituted an appropriate purpose for collecting, using, or disclosing personal information under s.5(3) of PIPEDA

The complainant challenged the Department of Justice Canada's (Justice) decision to withhold an entire Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) for legal services under section 23 of the Access to Information Act. Justice claimed the entire MOU was protected by solicitor-client privilege. The Commissioner found that Justice failed to demonstrate that general identifying information, such as the title and signature blocks, fell under this privilege. Furthermore, the Commissioner determined that Justice had waived its solicitor-client privilege over certain information within the MOU. Consequently, the Commissioner concluded that the complaint was well founded and recommended the release of part of the record. Justice indicated its intention to implement this recommendation.

• Whether the entire Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was protected by solicitor-client privilege under s.23 ATIA
• Whether general identifying information (title, signature blocks) in the MOU was protected by solicitor-client privilege
• Whether solicitor-client privilege had been waived over any information in the MOU

The complainant alleged that National Defence (DND) failed to respond to an access to information request within the statutory time limits. DND argued that the request did not meet the requirements of section 6 of the Access to Information Act, which stipulates that a request must be for a record under the control of a government institution. The OIC investigated whether DND's decision not to process the request was justified. The Commissioner found that DND had made numerous attempts to clarify the request with the applicant, but the applicant did not provide the necessary clarification to enable DND to identify the records sought. Consequently, the Commissioner concluded that DND was not obligated to process a request that did not adequately describe the records. The complaint was therefore deemed not well-founded.

• Whether the access request met the requirements of section 6 of the Access to Information Act
• Whether National Defence was justified in not processing the request due to lack of clarity
• Whether National Defence failed to respond within the statutory time limits

The complainant challenged the Canadian Human Rights Commission's (CHRC) decision to withhold information under subsections 19(1) (personal information), section 22 (testing/auditing procedures), and section 23 (solicitor-client privilege) of the Access to Information Act. During the investigation, the CHRC agreed to release all information previously withheld under section 22 and some under section 23. The OIC found that while some information met the requirements for personal information under s.19(1), specific file numbers did not, as their disclosure would not identify an individual. Regarding solicitor-client privilege, the OIC found that certain draft investigation reports were not shown to have received legal review or advice, thus not meeting the exemption's criteria. The Commissioner recommended the disclosure of the file numbers and the draft investigation reports. The CHRC agreed to the recommendations and released the additional information.

• Whether s.19(1) personal information exemption applies to personal contact information of government employees, leave information, and names of CHRC complainants
• Whether s.19(1) personal information exemption applies to file numbers
• Whether the institution reasonably exercised discretion under s.19(2) for applicable personal information
• Whether s.22 testing/auditing procedures exemption applies
• Whether s.23 solicitor-client privilege exemption applies to communications between client and counsel for legal advice
• Whether s.23 solicitor-client privilege exemption applies to draft investigation reports
• Whether the institution reasonably exercised discretion under s.23 for applicable solicitor-client privileged information

A Canadian traveler complained that the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) inappropriately collected his cell phone passcode during a border inspection. The complainant argued the collection was unauthorized and unnecessary, as he offered to unlock the phone himself. The OPC acknowledged CBSA's authority under the Customs Act to require passcodes for digital device inspections, citing reasons such as preventing data alteration and ensuring evidence continuity. However, the OPC found that the CBSA officer failed to follow policy by not taking notes and not informing the complainant about passcode retention and the option to change it. The OPC also questioned the necessity of retaining passcodes when no further action was taken. The CBSA committed to providing more training and revising its policy to ensure passcodes are handled more sensitively.

• Whether the CBSA has the authority to require a traveller to provide a passcode to unlock a digital device for inspection purposes under the Customs Act
• Whether the CBSA officer followed internal policies regarding the collection and retention of personal information (passcodes)
• Whether the CBSA's retention of the passcode was necessary beyond the examination process when no further action was taken
• Whether passcodes constitute sensitive personal information