Canadian privacy & access decisions

The complainant alleged that TransUnion disclosed his credit file information to Statistics Canada without consent, and that this information was subsequently used for debt collection. TransUnion argued that it was authorized to disclose the information under PIPEDA paragraph 7(3)(i) because the disclosure was required by law, specifically section 13 of the Statistics Act. The OPC found that TransUnion was authorized to disclose the information under PIPEDA subparagraph 7(3)(c.1)(iii), as Statistics Canada had identified its lawful authority and the disclosure was for administering the Statistics Act. The OPC also found no evidence that Statistics Canada disclosed the complainant's information for debt collection purposes. Therefore, the complaint was deemed not well-founded.

• Whether TransUnion disclosed the complainant's credit file information to Statistics Canada without requisite consent
• Whether TransUnion was authorized to disclose personal information without consent under PIPEDA subparagraph 7(3)(c.1)(iii)
• Whether Statistics Canada identified its lawful authority to obtain the information
• Whether the disclosure was requested to administer a law of Canada (the Statistics Act)
• Whether Statistics Canada subsequently disclosed the complainant's credit file information to other government institutions for debt collection
• Whether there was sufficient evidence to support the allegation of information misuse for debt collection

This joint investigation by the OPC and OIPC BC examined AggregateIQ Data Services Ltd. (AIQ), a BC-based company providing data services to political campaigns globally, for its compliance with PIPEDA and PIPA. The investigation focused on AIQ's consent practices for collecting, using, and disclosing personal information, and its security safeguards. The Commissioners found that AIQ failed to ensure adequate consent for its work with SCL Elections (US campaigns), Vote Leave (Brexit), and some Canadian campaigns, particularly regarding the use of sensitive information and disclosure to social media platforms for targeted advertising and analytics. They also found that AIQ failed to implement reasonable security measures, leading to a data breach that exposed login credentials and put the personal information of 35 million people at risk. While the security issue was resolved through AIQ's remedial actions, the overall matter was deemed well-founded-conditionally-resolved as AIQ committed to implementing recommendations regarding consent verification and data deletion, with a follow-up planned.

• Whether AIQ was compliant with consent requirements for the collection, use, or disclosure of personal information under PIPEDA and PIPA.
• Whether AIQ could rely on consent obtained by its clients for its own collection, use, and disclosure of personal information.
• Whether consent was adequate for specific uses, such as disclosing personal information to Facebook for "custom audiences" and "lookalike audiences."
• Whether consent was adequate for sensitive personal information, such as political opinions or psychographic profiles.
• Whether AIQ took reasonable security measures to protect the personal information in its custody or control under PIPEDA and PIPA.
• Whether the security breach involving the GitLab repository constituted a failure of reasonable security measures.
• Whether personal information collected from public telephone directories required consent.

The complainant alleged that Loblaw collected more personal information than necessary for its $25 gift card program and was concerned about data transfers to a US-based third party. Loblaw requested ID (utility bill or driver's license) from some registrants to verify eligibility and prevent fraud, but initially failed to specify that only name and address were needed and other information could be redacted. The OPC found that Loblaw initially over-collected information under Principle 4.4, but this issue was resolved when Loblaw clarified its requirements. Regarding the cross-border transfer of data to a US Program Administrator, the OPC found that Loblaw had sufficient contractual safeguards in place to ensure a comparable level of protection (Principle 4.1.3) and was transparent about these transfers (Principle 4.8). No additional consent was required for the transfer of name and address information, as it was for the original purpose. The complaint was found well-founded and resolved for over-collection, and not well-founded for the data transfer issues.

• Whether Loblaw collected more personal information than necessary for the Loblaw Card Program (Principle 4.4)
• Whether Loblaw ensured a comparable level of protection for personal information transferred to a third party for processing (Principle 4.1.3)
• Whether Loblaw was required to obtain additional consent for the transfer of personal information for processing (Principle 4.3)
• Whether Loblaw was sufficiently open and transparent about its cross-border data transfers (Principle 4.8)

The Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada (OPC) and the Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner for British Columbia (OIPC BC) conducted a joint investigation into Facebook, Inc.'s compliance with PIPEDA and PIPA following revelations about the "thisisyourdigitallife" (TYDL) app and its data sharing with Cambridge Analytica. The investigation focused on Facebook's consent practices for both installing users and their friends, its data safeguards, and its overall accountability. The OPC found that Facebook failed to obtain meaningful consent from users for the disclosure of their personal information to third-party apps, including the TYDL app, and that its safeguards against unauthorized access and use were inadequate. Furthermore, Facebook was deemed to have abdicated its responsibility for user information, demonstrating a lack of accountability. Despite recommendations from the OPC, Facebook rejected or refused to implement them, leading to a finding that the complaint was well-founded and remains unresolved. The OPC stated it would pursue further action under its authorities.

• Whether the OPC and OIPC BC had jurisdiction to investigate the matter.
• Whether Facebook's provision of access to personal information via its Graph API constitutes a "disclosure" under PIPEDA.
• Whether Facebook obtained valid and meaningful consent from installing users for the disclosure of their personal information to third-party apps, including the TYDL App.
• Whether Facebook made reasonable efforts to ensure third-party apps obtained meaningful consent from installing users.
• Whether Facebook's reliance on overbroad and conflicting language in its privacy communications was sufficient for meaningful consent from installing users.
• Whether Facebook obtained meaningful consent from friends of installing users (Affected Users) for the disclosure of their personal information to third-party apps.
• Whether Facebook had adequate safeguards to protect user information against unauthorized access, use, and disclosure by apps.
• Whether Facebook's monitoring and enforcement of its Platform Policy were adequate.
• Whether Facebook's implementation of Graph v2 and App Review adequately addressed safeguard concerns for ongoing compliance.
• Whether Facebook was accountable for the user information under its control.
• Whether Facebook's policies and practices gave effect to the privacy principles under PIPEDA and PIPA.

The Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada (OPC) investigated a 2017 data breach that compromised the personal information of approximately 19,000 Canadians held by Equifax Inc., the US parent company of Equifax Canada Co. The investigation examined the adequacy of security safeguards by both entities, Equifax Canada's accountability for data processed by Equifax Inc., the validity of consent obtained for data transfers, retention practices, and the sufficiency of post-breach mitigation measures. The OPC concluded that both Equifax Inc. and Equifax Canada contravened PIPEDA in all these areas, citing inadequate vulnerability management, network segregation, basic information security practices, and oversight. Equifax Canada signed a compliance agreement, committing to corrective measures for most findings, which were deemed well-founded and conditionally resolved. However, the finding regarding post-breach safeguards was only partially resolved, as Equifax Canada committed to extended credit monitoring but not a free credit freeze product.

• Whether Equifax Inc.'s security safeguards were appropriate to the sensitivity of the information as required by PIPEDA Safeguards Principle 4.7.
• Whether Equifax Inc.'s retention and destruction practices for Canadian personal information complied with PIPEDA Principle 4.5.
• Whether Equifax Canada demonstrated adequate accountability for protecting Canadian personal information handled by Equifax Inc. as required under PIPEDA Principle 4.1.
• Whether there was adequate consent from Canadians for the collection of their personal information by Equifax Inc. and disclosure to Equifax Inc. by Equifax Canada, as required under PIPEDA Principle 4.3 and s.6.1.
• Whether Equifax Canada's security safeguards for personal information it held directly were appropriate as required by PIPEDA Safeguards Principle 4.7.
• Whether the post-breach mitigation measures offered by Equifax Canada were adequate to protect against unauthorized use of compromised personal information as required by PIPEDA Safeguards Principle 4.7.1.

A complainant alleged that Grey House Publishing Canada (Grey House) collected, used, and disclosed his personal information without consent by publishing it in its directories and selling it to Economic and Social Development Canada (ESDC) for email distribution. Grey House argued the information was business contact information, not personal information, and that its activities were not commercial. The OPC found the information was personal information and Grey House's activities were commercial. The OPC determined Grey House did not obtain adequate consent, as the publicly available information exceptions did not apply and the complainant could not have reasonably expected such use. The OPC also found Grey House's privacy statement contravened the openness principle. Grey House removed the complainant's information and agreed to revise its privacy statement.

• Whether the complainant's contact information constituted 'personal information' under PIPEDA
• Whether Grey House Publishing Canada was engaged in 'commercial activity' under PIPEDA
• Whether Grey House obtained adequate consent for the collection, use, and disclosure of the complainant's personal information
• Whether the 'publicly available information' exceptions to consent applied
• Whether Grey House's privacy statement met the 'openness' principle under PIPEDA

The complaint concerned 411Numbers, an operator of websites providing free access to telephone numbers and associated information, including unlisted numbers, and formerly charging a fee for removal. The complainant alleged collection without consent, use for an inappropriate purpose (paid removal), over-collection of information for removal services, and unresponsiveness to privacy queries. The OPC asserted jurisdiction over 411Numbers due to a 'real and substantial connection' to Canada, despite its Hong Kong incorporation. The OPC found that 411Numbers contravened Principle 4.3 by publishing unlisted numbers without consent, as they are not 'publicly available' under the Regulations. The practice of charging for removal ceased during the investigation, resolving that aspect, though the OPC noted it would likely be an inappropriate purpose. The OPC also found contraventions of Principle 4.3.3 for over-collecting identification for removal requests and Principles 4.1, 4.1.2, 4.1.4, 4.8, and 4.10 regarding accountability, openness, and challenging compliance. Based on 411Numbers' commitments to remove unlisted data, improve due diligence, and enhance its privacy practices, the matter was deemed well-founded and conditionally resolved.

• Whether the OPC had jurisdiction over 411Numbers, a Hong Kong-incorporated company with servers outside Canada, due to a 'real and substantial connection' to Canada.
• Whether 411Numbers collected, used, and disclosed the complainant's personal information (unlisted phone number, name, address) without knowledge and consent, contravening Principle 4.3.
• Whether information associated with unlisted telephone numbers constitutes 'publicly available' information under paragraph 1(a) of the Regulations Specifying Publicly Available Information.
• Whether 411Numbers exercised due diligence to ensure its databases did not include unlisted numbers.
• Whether publishing personal information for the purpose of encouraging individuals to pay to have it removed constitutes an inappropriate purpose under s. 5(3) of PIPEDA.
• Whether 411Numbers required individuals to provide more information than necessary for removal services, contravening Principle 4.3.3.
• Whether 411Numbers met its obligations regarding accountability under Principles 4.1, 4.1.2, and 4.1.4.
• Whether 411Numbers met its obligations regarding openness under Principle 4.8 and 4.8.3.
• Whether 411Numbers met its obligations regarding challenging compliance under Principle 4.10.