Canadian privacy & access decisions

The Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada (OPC) launched a Commissioner-initiated investigation (CII) into a privacy breach at WestJet that occurred on June 12, 2025. An unauthorized third party gained access to an employee's administrative account, bypassed multi-factor authentication, deployed ransomware, and exfiltrated data affecting approximately 5.1 million Canadian employees and customers. The breach exposed names, dates of birth, email addresses, mailing addresses, phone numbers, gender, travel booking information, and passport details, but no credit card numbers or SINs. WestJet took immediate containment measures, reported the breach, and provided direct and indirect notifications, credit monitoring, and identity theft protection services. WestJet has committed to further actions, including an external security assessment and providing a summary report to the OPC by August 7, 2026, to ensure the adequacy of its updated security safeguards and prevent future breaches. The CII will be discontinued upon the Commissioner being satisfied that WestJet has fulfilled all commitments.

• Adequacy of security safeguards under PIPEDA
• Adequacy of notifications to affected individuals under PIPEDA
• Whether WestJet's post-breach remediation actions and future commitments provide a fair and reasonable response to the incident

The Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada (OPC) investigated complaints against Loblaw Companies Ltd. (Loblaw) regarding its PC Optimum Loyalty Program, focusing on the handling of privacy challenges and the retention of personal information. The investigation found that Loblaw contravened PIPEDA Principle 4.10 by failing to adequately address privacy challenges and respond to account deletion requests in a timely manner, though this issue was resolved during the investigation as Loblaw enhanced its procedures. The OPC also found that Loblaw contravened PIPEDA Principle 4.5.3 by not sufficiently anonymizing personal information retained from closed PC Optimum accounts, meaning there was a serious possibility of re-identification. Loblaw disagreed with this finding but agreed to engage an independent third party to assess its anonymization process and implement recommendations. A preliminary matter regarding requiring physical card holders to create an online account for deletion was found not well-founded. The overall outcome reflects a mix of resolved and conditionally resolved well-founded findings.

• Whether Loblaw adequately addresses privacy challenges raised by individuals concerning account deletion (PIPEDA Principle 4.10)
• Whether Loblaw retains personal information of PC Optimum members for longer than necessary after account closure (PIPEDA Principle 4.5.3)
• Whether Loblaw collected unnecessary personal information by requiring physical card holders to create an online account to delete their PC Optimum account (PIPEDA Principle 4.4)
• Whether Loblaw established retention schedules for customer support logs (PIPEDA Principle 4.5.2)
• Whether Loblaw retains universal login credentials (PCids) for longer than necessary for members with no other associated accounts (PIPEDA Principle 4.5.3)
• Whether Loblaw's anonymization process for retained Historical Transaction Data, Loyalty Data, and Usage Data ensures no serious possibility of re-identification
• Whether Loblaw's retention of public IP address data after account closure is sufficiently anonymized
• Whether Loblaw's practice of retaining email domain portions after account closure is sufficiently anonymized
• Whether manual processing errors in Loblaw's de-identification process were adequately detected and addressed
• Whether Loblaw ensured identifiers were removed from back-up systems as part of its anonymization process
• Whether Loblaw considered the impact of other factors affecting re-identification risk, such as separately retained PCid data

The complainant alleged that Bell Canada contravened PIPEDA by failing to respond to an access request within 30 days and by denying access to his cellphone logs. The OPC found that Bell contravened subsection 8(3) of PIPEDA for the delayed response and Principle 4.9 for denying access, as the phone logs constituted the complainant's personal information. The OPC determined that the complainant's privacy interest in his phone logs outweighed the ex-spouse's interest, and there was a public interest in disclosure. Bell agreed to provide the requested logs to the complainant, resolving that aspect of the complaint. Bell also committed to implementing recommendations to improve its access request procedures and enhance openness regarding data access on shared accounts, leading to a conditionally resolved outcome for these issues.

• Whether Bell responded to the Complainant’s access request within thirty days as per subsection 8(3) of PIPEDA
• Whether Bell adequately responded to the Complainant’s request to access his personal information under Principle 4.9 of PIPEDA
• Whether phone logs relating to a specific phoneline constitute the personal information of the phoneline's user, even if they are not the account holder
• Whether the Complainant's interest in accessing the phone logs is greater than the ex-spouse's interest in non-disclosure of the phone logs
• Whether Bell was sufficiently open with individuals about account holders' access to phone usage details on shared accounts, contrary to PIPEDA's Openness principle (Principle 4.8.1)

A former employee complained that Staples Canada ULC (Staples) failed to adequately protect and remove personal information from returned laptops before reselling them through its Openbox program. The complainant alleged that Staples lacked adequate internal policies, processes, and training for staff to wipe data from these devices. The OPC's investigation found deficiencies in Staples' policies, procedures, and training, and that employees did not consistently follow manufacturer guidelines for data wiping, leading to residual personal information on 23% of sampled devices. Staples agreed to implement recommendations to improve its data wiping procedures, training, and to arrange for independent third-party spot checks. The OPC concluded that Staples contravened PIPEDA Principles 4.7.1 and 4.7.3.

• Whether Staples had adequate security safeguards to protect personal information on returned laptops under Principle 4.7.1 PIPEDA
• Whether Staples' methods of protection included adequate physical, organizational, and technological measures under Principle 4.7.3 PIPEDA
• Whether Staples' internal policies and procedures for data wiping were clear and consistent
• Whether Staples provided adequate training to employees responsible for wiping data from returned devices
• Whether Staples consistently performed full data wipes according to manufacturer instructions on returned laptops

A joint investigation by the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada (OPC) and provincial privacy regulators (CAI, OIPC BC, OIPC AB) examined TikTok Pte. Ltd.'s compliance with federal and provincial private sector privacy laws. The investigation focused on TikTok's collection, use, and disclosure of personal information for ad targeting and content personalization, with a particular emphasis on practices affecting children. The Offices found that TikTok's age assurance measures were inadequate, leading to the collection and use of sensitive personal information from a large number of underage users for purposes deemed inappropriate. Furthermore, TikTok failed to obtain valid and meaningful consent from both adult and youth users due to unclear, inaccessible, and incomplete privacy communications, including regarding biometric information and cross-border data transfers. The CAI specifically identified contraventions related to Quebec's transparency and privacy-by-default obligations. While TikTok disagreed with the findings, it committed to implementing enhanced age assurance mechanisms, improving privacy communications, and limiting ad targeting for under-18 users. The Offices concluded the matter as well-founded and conditionally resolved, contingent on TikTok's satisfactory implementation of these significant commitments.

• Whether TikTok was collecting, using, and disclosing personal information, particularly with respect to children, for an appropriate, reasonable, and legitimate purpose.
• Whether TikTok's age assurance mechanisms were effective in preventing underage users from accessing the platform.
• Whether TikTok obtained valid and meaningful consent from its users for tracking, profiling, targeting, and content personalization.
• Whether TikTok's privacy communications provided sufficient upfront, clear, and comprehensive information to adult users to ensure meaningful consent.
• Whether TikTok adequately explained its collection and use of users' biometric information to ensure meaningful consent.
• Whether TikTok's privacy communications were adequate to obtain meaningful consent from youth (13-17), considering their cognitive development and potential harms from targeted ads.
• Whether TikTok met its obligations under Quebec's Private Sector Act to inform persons concerned about the collection and use of personal information for user profiles, ad targeting, and content personalization.
• Whether TikTok ensured that privacy settings provided the highest level of privacy by default under Quebec's Private Sector Act.

The Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada (OPC) investigated Agronomy Company of Canada Ltd. following a complaint alleging inadequate safeguards, lack of accountability, and invalid consent for personal information collection and use, stemming from a data breach. A malicious actor gained access to Agronomy's systems, exfiltrating sensitive personal information of 845 individuals, including SINs, financial details, and identification documents, before deploying ransomware. The OPC found Agronomy failed to implement appropriate safeguards, citing a lack of multifactor authentication, network segregation, data encryption, and detection tools, which contributed to the breach. Furthermore, Agronomy lacked a comprehensive privacy policy, a designated privacy officer, and adequate staff training, indicating a failure in accountability. While these two aspects were found well-founded, Agronomy committed to significant improvements, leading to a conditionally resolved outcome. However, the OPC found the complaint regarding invalid consent for credit services not well-founded, as the complainant had signed a clearly labelled credit application and utilized the extended credit.

• Whether Agronomy implemented appropriate safeguards to adequately protect personal information under its control, as per PIPEDA Principle 4.7.
• Whether Agronomy's technical safeguards (multifactor authentication, network segregation, data encryption, detection and response tools) were appropriate for the sensitivity of the information.
• Whether Agronomy's organizational safeguards (incident response protocols, information management, security documentation, staff training) were adequate.
• Whether Agronomy was accountable for personal information under its control, including designating an individual for PIPEDA compliance and implementing policies and practices, as per PIPEDA Principle 4.1.
• Whether Agronomy obtained valid and meaningful consent for the collection and use of personal information for credit services, particularly sensitive information, as per PIPEDA Principle 4.3.

A truck driver complained that Trimac Transportation Services Inc. (Trimac) installed a dash camera in his vehicle that continuously recorded audio and video without his consent, particularly concerned with audio recording. The OPC investigated two main issues: the appropriateness of the audio recording functionality and whether employee consent was required. The OPC found that Trimac's continuous audio recording, even when drivers were off-duty, was disproportionately privacy-intrusive, despite legitimate business needs. Trimac also initially failed to be transparent about the disciplinary purposes of the system, meaning it could not rely on the employment relationship exception to consent. Trimac agreed to implement recommendations to limit audio recording to on-duty hours and restrict access to recorded clips, and has since clarified the system's disciplinary uses to employees. The OPC found the audio recording issue well-founded and conditionally resolved, and the consent issue well-founded and resolved.

• Whether road safety, asset protection, and employee performance management are appropriate purposes for the continuous collection of in-cabin audio via the System, including when drivers are off-duty and not driving, under subsection 5(3) of PIPEDA.
• Whether the collection of sensitive personal information (in-cabin audio) was justified given the legitimate need, effectiveness, less privacy-invasive means, and proportionality.
• Whether employee consent was required for the collection of personal information via the System, specifically whether Trimac could rely on the exception to consent under subsection 7.3 of PIPEDA.
• Whether Trimac was sufficiently transparent about the disciplinary purposes of its dash camera system to rely on the subsection 7.3 exception to consent.

On November 30, 2018, Marriott International, Inc. announced a data security breach involving unauthorized access to a Starwood Hotels database, which it had acquired in 2016. The breach, spanning over four years, affected up to 12.8 million Canadian records, including passport and payment card details. The OPC launched an investigation into Luxury Hotels Canada, Marriott's Canadian operating company, following eleven complaints. The investigation found Marriott's security safeguards, accountability measures, and information retention practices to be inadequate, contravening PIPEDA Principles 4.7, 4.1.4, and 4.5. Specifically, Marriott failed to detect the breach sooner due to insufficient logging, monitoring, and multi-factor authentication, and retained personal information longer than necessary. While Marriott's notification to affected individuals was deemed adequate, the OPC had outstanding concerns regarding remote access, unencrypted data storage, and retention periods. The findings are well-founded and conditionally resolved, as Marriott committed to implementing the OPC's recommendations, including engaging an external assessor and reviewing its privacy framework.

• Whether personal information held by Marriott was protected by security safeguards appropriate to the sensitivity of the information as required by Principle 4.7 (Safeguards).
• Whether Marriott demonstrated due diligence and took steps to fulfil its responsibilities to implement policies and practices to protect personal information under Principle 4.1.4 (Accountability) when acquiring control of the Starwood network.
• Whether Marriott retained personal information for longer than necessary, relevant to Principle 4.5 (Limiting use, disclosure and retention).
• Whether the mitigation measures offered by Marriott to affected individuals were adequate to protect their personal information from unauthorized use, such as future identity theft, in accordance with Principle 4.7 (Safeguards).

A joint investigation by federal and provincial privacy authorities found that the Tim Hortons App continuously tracked users' granular location data, often every few minutes, even when the app was closed. This data was used to infer home, work, travel status, and visits to competitors. The Offices concluded that Tim Hortons collected this sensitive information for an inappropriate purpose, as it never used the data for its stated goal of targeted advertising, and the privacy loss was disproportionate to any potential benefits. Furthermore, Tim Hortons failed to obtain valid consent, making misleading statements that the app only tracked location when open and not adequately informing users of the extensive nature and consequences of the tracking. Concerns were also raised about inadequate contractual protections with the third-party service provider, Radar, and a broader lack of accountability within Tim Hortons' privacy management. The matter was found well-founded and conditionally resolved, as Tim Hortons agreed to delete the collected data and establish a comprehensive privacy management program.

• Whether Tim Hortons collected or used personal information for an appropriate purpose under the Acts.
• Whether Tim Hortons obtained valid consent for the collection and use of granular location data.
• Adequacy of contractual protections for personal information transferred to third-party service providers.
• Tim Hortons' accountability and implementation of a privacy management program.

The OPC initiated a complaint against MGM Resorts International after media reports revealed a 2019 data breach affecting millions, including Canadians, for which MGM had not reported to the OPC. The investigation focused on whether MGM complied with mandatory breach reporting obligations under PIPEDA. The OPC found that MGM contravened PIPEDA by failing to promptly assess whether the breach posed a real risk of significant harm (RROSH) to affected Canadians and by not reporting the breach or notifying individuals as soon as feasible. MGM had delayed its assessment for Canadians for several months compared to its U.S. customers. In response to OPC recommendations, MGM committed to amending its privacy breach response framework to ensure timely RROSH assessments, reporting to the Commissioner, and notifying affected individuals for future breaches involving Canadians. The matter was found to be well-founded and conditionally resolved.

• Whether MGM had the obligation to report the breach to the OPC and notify affected Canadians
• Whether the MGM breach met the RROSH reporting and notification threshold
• Whether the personal information involved was sensitive
• Whether there was a high probability of misuse of the personal information
• Whether MGM notified the OPC and affected Canadians as soon as feasible

The complainant alleged that Rogers Communications Inc. improperly enrolled her in its Voice ID voiceprint authentication program without her consent and failed to allow her to opt out or delete her voiceprint. Rogers utilized a passive voiceprinting technology, "tuning," to create algorithmic voiceprints for customer authentication and fraud prevention. The Office of the Privacy Commissioner (OPC) found Rogers' purpose for collecting voiceprints to be appropriate, concluding this aspect of the complaint was not well-founded. However, the OPC determined that Rogers failed to obtain valid and meaningful express consent for the collection of sensitive biometric voiceprints, both during the "tuning" process and enrolment, as customers would not reasonably expect this. Furthermore, Rogers did not provide a clearly explained and easily accessible option for individuals to opt out and improperly retained voiceprints of opted-out individuals without any actual purpose. The OPC also identified deficiencies in Rogers' training materials and monitoring protocols for ensuring staff obtained valid consent. In response to OPC recommendations, Rogers committed to significant changes, including obtaining express consent before tuning, clearly informing customers of opt-out/deletion, deleting retained voiceprints, and improving training and monitoring. Consequently, the consent and retention aspects of the complaint were found to be well-founded and conditionally resolved.

• Whether the collection and use of voiceprints for authentication and fraud prevention constituted an appropriate purpose under PIPEDA s. 5(3)
• Whether Rogers obtained valid and meaningful consent for the collection of voiceprints (tuning and enrolment) under PIPEDA Principle 4.3 and s. 6.1
• Whether Rogers provided an adequate mechanism for the withdrawal of consent under PIPEDA Principle 4.3.8
• Whether Rogers' retention of voiceprints after opt-out was compliant with PIPEDA Principle 4.5.3
• Whether Rogers' training materials and protocols for obtaining consent were adequate

An individual complained that Fido failed to safeguard his personal information, allowing fraudsters to repeatedly access his account, and that Fido did not provide his access request in an understandable format. The OPC found that Fido's employees repeatedly bypassed authentication protocols, leading to unauthorized disclosures of the complainant's personal information, indicating a systemic safeguards issue. Fido committed to implementing recommendations to enhance its authentication protocols and staff training. Regarding the access request, the OPC found that while Fido could provide call recordings instead of transcripts, the poor quality and restrictive listening conditions made the access not generally understandable. Fido subsequently provided transcripts. The safeguards aspect of the complaint was found well-founded and conditionally resolved, while the access aspect was found well-founded and resolved.

• Whether Fido adequately safeguarded the Complainant’s personal information under Principle 4.7
• Whether Fido responded to the Complainant’s access request in a generally understandable format under Principle 4.9 and 4.9.4

A complainant alleged that a charitable organization (the Respondent) failed to obtain proper consent before sharing his personal information through a donor list trading program. The Respondent used an opt-out checkbox on its mail-in donation forms, which the complainant found inadequate after receiving solicitations from another charity. The OPC determined that sharing donor information with other charities for solicitation purposes was outside the reasonable expectations of donors, thus requiring express opt-in consent. Furthermore, the information provided by the Respondent on its donation forms, inserts, and privacy policy was deemed insufficient to enable meaningful consent. The OPC recommended that the Respondent obtain express opt-in consent and enhance its privacy communications to clearly explain the nature, purpose, and consequences of the data sharing. The Respondent agreed to implement these recommendations, leading to a conditionally resolved outcome.

• Whether the Respondent obtained meaningful consent for its donor list trading program under PIPEDA
• Whether opt-out consent was appropriate for sharing donor information with third parties
• Whether the information shared (donor name, address, donation status) was sensitive in this context
• Whether sharing donor information with other charities for solicitation was within the reasonable expectations of donors
• Whether the donor list trading program created a meaningful residual risk of significant harm
• Whether the information provided to donors on the donation form, insert, and privacy policy was sufficient to support meaningful consent

The Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada (OPC) investigated CoreFour Inc.'s compliance with PIPEDA regarding its Edsby K-12 learning management system, following a complaint about safeguards, breach response, and accountability. Regarding safeguards, the OPC found that while CoreFour had many effective security practices, it had specific vulnerabilities, including weak password requirements for parental accounts, inadequate protection for student profile picture thumbnails, and a failure to scan for malware on third-party content uploads. The OPC concluded that CoreFour lacked a robust overarching information security framework, leading to a finding of "well-founded" for safeguards. On breach reporting and notification, the OPC determined that the password vulnerability occurred before mandatory reporting, and the student image vulnerability, while a breach, did not pose a "real risk of significant harm" as the only unauthorized access was by the complainant. Therefore, CoreFour was not required to report these incidents, and its breach reporting procedures were found to be compliant, leading to a "not well-founded" finding for this issue. For accountability, the OPC found CoreFour lacked a privacy management framework, appropriate written policies (e.g., complaint handling, data retention), adequate privacy training for staff, and its Privacy Policy was unclear in several respects, resulting in a "well-founded" finding. CoreFour committed to implementing all recommendations, including developing comprehensive information security and privacy management frameworks, updating its Privacy Policy, and providing a third-party report, leading to the "conditionally resolved" status for safeguards and accountability. The OPC will monitor CoreFour's progress to ensure full compliance with the Act.

• Whether CoreFour's security safeguards were appropriate to the sensitivity and volume of personal information under Principle 4.7 PIPEDA
• Whether CoreFour's weak password requirements for certain Edsby parental accounts constituted an inadequate safeguard
• Whether CoreFour's safeguards to protect against unauthorized access to thumbnail images of student profile pictures were adequate
• Whether Edsby's failure to scan for malware when uploading content from third-party applications constituted a safeguard weakness
• Whether CoreFour lacked a robust overarching information security framework, contravening Principle 4.1.4 and 4.7-4.7.3 PIPEDA
• Whether CoreFour had an adequate mechanism for handling and reporting privacy breaches under PIPEDA
• Whether CoreFour was required to report the password management vulnerability, given it occurred before mandatory breach reporting came into effect
• Whether the student image vulnerability created a "real risk of significant harm" requiring mandatory reporting and notification under s.10.1 PIPEDA
• Whether CoreFour maintained a breach register as required under s.10.3 PIPEDA
• Whether CoreFour lacked a privacy management framework, including appropriate written internal policies and practices (e.g., complaint handling, data retention), contravening Principle 4.1.4 PIPEDA
• Whether CoreFour provided adequate privacy training to its employees, consultants, contractors, and students
• Whether CoreFour's Privacy Policy was unclear regarding the characterization of personal information, its responsibility for security, and the sharing of user information

The complainant alleged that Yahoo! Canada's default "Stay signed in" setting for Yahoo Mail, particularly for Rogers Yahoo Mail users, posed significant privacy concerns on public or shared computers. The OPC investigated whether Yahoo adequately safeguarded against unauthorized access and obtained valid consent for potential disclosures. The OPC found that Yahoo's safeguards were not appropriate for the sensitivity of email content and that its consent for the "Stay signed in" setting was not meaningful. Yahoo committed to changing the setting to opt-in and providing clearer information about privacy implications. Rogers, while not a respondent, also agreed to implement measures for Rogers Yahoo Mail users. The complaint was found to be well-founded and conditionally resolved.

• Whether Yahoo's safeguards against unauthorized third-party access to email content on public or shared computers were adequate under Principle 4.7 PIPEDA
• Whether Yahoo obtained valid and meaningful consent for the disclosure of personal information to others who subsequently access emails via the "Stay signed in" setting under Principle 4.3 PIPEDA
• Whether the "Stay signed in" setting was clearly and prominently displayed
• Whether a reasonable person would understand the "Stay signed in" setting to be "on" by default
• Whether the "Stay signed in" setting is consistent with industry standards
• Whether Yahoo's additional safeguards (algorithm, sign-out option, session expiration, password reset, security information) were effective
• Whether express opt-in consent was required for the "Stay signed in" setting due to sensitivity of information, reasonable expectations, and risk of harm
• Whether the language "stay signed in" provided users with key information for meaningful consent