Canadian privacy & access decisions

A complainant alleged that a property management company improperly collected, used, and disclosed tenants' personal information by maintaining a "bad tenant list" for a landlord association, leading to her rental application rejection. The company confirmed it held the list, arguing tenants consented via a rental application clause. The OPC found that the consent clause was not meaningful for this purpose and that the company was acting as an unlicensed credit reporting agency, making the purpose inappropriate under PIPEDA s.5(3). The OPC also found issues with the accuracy of the information and the lack of opportunity for individuals to challenge it. The company disagreed with being classified as a credit reporting agency but agreed to destroy the list and cease its collection, use, and disclosure. The matter was found to be well-founded and resolved.

• Whether the collection, use, and disclosure of personal information for a "bad tenant list" was for purposes that a reasonable person would consider appropriate in the circumstances (s.5(3) PIPEDA)
• Whether the property management company was acting as an unlicensed credit reporting agency under provincial legislation
• Whether meaningful knowledge and consent of individuals were obtained for the collection, use, and disclosure of their personal information for the "bad tenant list" (Principle 4.3, 4.3.2 PIPEDA)
• Whether the personal information on the "bad tenant list" was accurate, complete, and up-to-date (Principle 4.6, 4.6.1 PIPEDA)
• Whether individuals had the ability to challenge the accuracy of information about them on the list (Principle 4.10 PIPEDA)

An individual received their RRSP tax contribution statement from a financial institution, but one copy contained the personal information of another individual, including their name, address, account number, RRSP contribution, and social insurance number. The financial institution reported the mass-mailing error to the OPC, explaining that a production error during automated printing caused a few hundred incorrect statements to be mailed. The OPC noted that the financial institution reacted quickly by assembling a breach response team, notifying affected clients, providing new statements, increasing account monitoring, and offering complimentary credit alert monitoring. The institution also asked clients to destroy incorrect statements and implemented new internal controls to prevent future errors. The OPC highlighted the importance of precautions in mass mail-outs and having systems to respond to errors.

• Whether the financial institution adequately safeguarded personal information during mass mail-outs
• Whether the financial institution responded appropriately to a privacy breach involving misdirected mail

A Canadian financial institution reported a privacy breach where a fraudster used deceptive impersonation techniques to obtain contact information for approximately 100 customers from its customer service centre employees. The fraudster then contacted these customers directly to extract additional sensitive personal information, potentially exposing them to identity theft. Upon discovering the incident, the financial institution alerted the OPC, conducted an investigation, and notified all affected customers, offering them complimentary credit protection monitoring. The institution also advised customers on how to prevent fraud and implemented enhanced controls and additional staff training to mitigate recurrence. No reports of fraud related to credit or debit cards were received by the institution as a result of the incident.

• Whether the financial institution adequately protected customer personal information from unauthorized disclosure by a fraudster
• Whether the financial institution took appropriate steps to mitigate the impact of the breach and prevent recurrence