Canadian privacy & access decisions

The complainant alleged that the Department of Justice Canada (Justice) failed to conduct a reasonable search for a 2009 workplace report prepared by a consultant. Justice tasked its Ontario Regional Office and the Deputy Minister’s Office, both of which reported no responsive records, citing a five-year retention period for such documents, which had expired seven years prior to the request. The OIC investigated whether Justice was required to contact the consultant directly to fulfill the request. Justice maintained that it was not reasonable to expect them to task the consultant, as the business need for the report was time-limited, copies should no longer be with the contractor, and the matter was no longer active. The OIC concluded that Justice conducted a reasonable search based on its internal efforts and retention policies. The complaint was therefore deemed not well founded.

• Whether the Department of Justice Canada conducted a reasonable search for records
• Whether the institution was required to contact a consultant directly to conduct a reasonable search
• Whether the institution's application of its record retention policy was appropriate in determining search scope

The complainant alleged that Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs Canada (CIRNAC) improperly withheld records under section 23 (solicitor-client and litigation privilege) of the Access to Information Act. The request sought records from the 1850s to 1980 related to land ownership, sale, reversion, or return on the Bruce/Saugeen Peninsula. CIRNAC initially claimed solicitor-client privilege but later conceded it did not apply, then reversed course to maintain section 23 based on litigation privilege, citing ongoing court cases. The Information Commissioner found that CIRNAC failed to establish that the records were subject to litigation privilege, specifically that they were produced or gathered for the dominant purpose of the cited litigation. The Commissioner recommended full disclosure of the records. CIRNAC refused to implement the recommendation, asserting the information remained protected by litigation privilege. The complaint was found to be well founded.

• Whether the records were subject to solicitor-client privilege under s.23 ATIA
• Whether the records were subject to litigation privilege under s.23 ATIA
• Whether the records were produced or gathered for the dominant purpose of litigation

The complainant alleged that the Privy Council Office (PCO) improperly withheld information under subsections 15(1) (national security, defence) and 19(1) (personal information) of the Access to Information Act concerning historical Canadian intelligence assessments. The OIC found that PCO was justified in withholding information under subsection 19(1). However, PCO failed to demonstrate how the release of distribution markings, names of former Communications Security Establishment (CSE) employees, a distribution list of allies, information on nuclear development programs, and technology transfer details would cause a reasonable expectation of harm under subsection 15(1). The Commissioner noted that similar information had been previously released by PCO and other institutions, discrediting PCO's claims of harm. Furthermore, the Commissioner was not satisfied that PCO properly exercised its discretion in deciding against disclosure. The complaint was found to be well founded, and PCO was ordered to disclose the records in their entirety, but PCO indicated it would not implement the order.

• Whether s.19(1) personal information exemption was properly applied
• Whether s.15(1) national security, defence exemption was properly applied to distribution markings
• Whether s.15(1) national security, defence exemption was properly applied to names of CSE employees
• Whether s.15(1) national security, defence exemption was properly applied to a distribution list of allies
• Whether s.15(1) national security, defence exemption was properly applied to information on nuclear development programs
• Whether s.15(1) national security, defence exemption was properly applied to information on technology transfer
• Whether s.15(1) national security, defence exemption was properly applied to information on a region-based working group
• Whether PCO reasonably exercised its discretion to disclose information under s.15(1)

The complainant alleged that the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC) improperly withheld information in response to an access request for final versions of documents. CMHC initially claimed exemptions under paragraphs 18(a), 18(b), 19(1), 20(1)(b), 21(1)(a), 21(1)(b), and section 23 of the Access to Information Act. During the investigation, the scope of the complaint was narrowed, and CMHC voluntarily disclosed some information previously withheld under paragraphs 18(a), 18(b), 21(1)(a), and 21(1)(b). The remaining information was withheld under paragraph 20(1)(b), concerning third-party financial, commercial, scientific, or technical information. The Information Commissioner found that CMHC and the third parties (TD Bank Financial Group and Andrew Kalotay Associates, Inc.) failed to demonstrate that the information met the requirements of paragraph 20(1)(b), as the third parties did not provide representations and CMHC could not show that all conditions for the exemption were met. Consequently, the Commissioner ordered CMHC to disclose all information withheld under paragraph 20(1)(b). CMHC agreed to implement the order.

• Whether s.18(a) ATIA (government trade secrets, government financial, commercial, scientific or technical information) was properly applied
• Whether s.18(b) ATIA (competitive position of government institutions, negotiations by government institutions) was properly applied
• Whether s.19(1) ATIA (personal information) was properly applied
• Whether s.20(1)(b) ATIA (confidential third-party financial, commercial, scientific or technical information) was properly applied
• Whether the information is financial, commercial, scientific or technical under s.20(1)(b) ATIA
• Whether the information is confidential under s.20(1)(b) ATIA
• Whether the third party supplied the information to a government institution under s.20(1)(b) ATIA
• Whether the third party has consistently treated the information as confidential under s.20(1)(b) ATIA
• Whether s.21(1)(a) ATIA (advice or recommendations) was properly applied
• Whether s.21(1)(b) ATIA (accounts of consultations or deliberations) was properly applied
• Whether s.23 ATIA (solicitor-client privilege) was properly applied

The Office of the Privacy Commissioner (OPC) investigated 18 complaints regarding the collection, use, and disclosure of vaccination information by Transport Canada, VIA Rail, and CATSA for domestic air and rail travel mandates between November 2021 and June 2022. Complainants alleged unlawful privacy violations and unreasonable limitations on mobility. The OPC found that the collection of vaccination information by CATSA and VIA Rail was directly related to their operating programs and activities, specifically administering Ministerial Orders for transportation safety. Furthermore, the uses and disclosures of personal information by CATSA and VIA Rail, and the centralized collection and use by Transport Canada, complied with sections 4, 7, and 8 of the Privacy Act. While necessity and proportionality are not direct legal requirements of the Privacy Act, the OPC assessed these principles and found the collections were overall necessary and proportional. However, the OPC identified concerns with the broad scope of the Orders' objectives and Transport Canada's limited documentation of less privacy-invasive alternatives. Consequently, the complaints were deemed not well-founded, but Transport Canada accepted recommendations for future similar measures to better define objectives and document alternative assessments. This report highlights the need to better reflect necessity and proportionality in public sector privacy law.

• Whether the vaccination information collected by CATSA and VIA Rail was directly related to their operating programs or activities, as required by section 4 of the Privacy Act
• Whether the uses or disclosures of personal information by CATSA and VIA Rail were compliant with sections 4, 7, and 8 of the Privacy Act
• Whether the centralized collection and use of personal information by Transport Canada was compliant with sections 4, 7, and 8 of the Privacy Act
• Whether the collection of information was demonstrably necessary to meet a specific need
• Whether the collection of information was likely to be effective in meeting that need
• Whether there were less privacy-intrusive ways of achieving the same end
• Whether the loss of privacy was proportional to the need

The Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada (OPC) investigated complaints regarding the collection, use, retention, and disclosure of personal information, including vaccination status, by the Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) and Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) under Emergency Orders for entry into Canada during the COVID-19 pandemic. Complainants argued the measures were unlawful, unnecessary, and disproportionate. The OPC found that the collection of personal information was directly related to an operating program or activity of PHAC and CBSA, and its use and disclosure were for the purpose collected or consistent with it, or authorized by an Act of Parliament. The OPC also determined that the retention and disposal of information complied with the Privacy Act and related regulations. While necessity and proportionality are not explicit requirements of the Privacy Act, the OPC assessed these principles and found the collection overall to be necessary and proportional. However, the OPC identified gaps in PHAC's assessment and documentation of less privacy-intrusive alternatives and clarity of objectives in the final six months of the Orders. All complaints alleging contraventions of the Privacy Act were found to be not well-founded.

• Whether the personal information collected was directly related to an operating program or activity of PHAC and CBSA (s.4 Privacy Act)
• Whether the personal information was used or disclosed for the purpose for which it was compiled/obtained, or in accordance with an Act of Parliament (s.7, s.8 Privacy Act)
• Whether the personal information was disposed of in accordance with the Privacy Regulations and the Directive on Privacy Practices (s.6(3) Privacy Act)
• Whether the collection of personal information under the Emergency Orders was necessary
• Whether the collection of personal information under the Emergency Orders was effective
• Whether there were less privacy-intrusive ways of achieving the same end
• Whether the loss of privacy was proportional to the need

The Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada (OPC) investigated a complaint regarding erroneous quarantine notifications sent by the ArriveCAN application to approximately 10,200 Apple device users. These notifications, issued between June 28 and July 20, 2022, incorrectly instructed fully vaccinated travellers to quarantine due to a defect in ArriveCAN version 3.0. The OPC found that the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) failed to take all reasonable steps to ensure the accuracy of personal information used for an administrative purpose, as required by subsection 6(2) of the Privacy Act. Specifically, the OPC identified shortcomings in rigorous pre-release testing, effective human intervention, and timely correction and recourse for affected individuals. The CBSA disagreed with the finding and refused to implement the OPC's recommendation to correct the inaccurate "quarantine_exempted" value in its database. Consequently, the complaint was found to be well-founded and unresolved.

• Whether the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) took all reasonable steps to ensure that personal information used for an administrative decision was as accurate as possible under subsection 6(2) of the Privacy Act.
• Whether the "quarantine_exempted" data field constituted personal information used for an administrative purpose by the CBSA.
• Whether the CBSA conducted rigorous pre-release testing for issues that could lead to the highest negative impacts on individual users.
• Whether the CBSA ensured effective human intervention with respect to high-impact decisions on individuals.
• Whether the CBSA provided effective and timely correction and recourse for individuals affected by inaccurate information.

A former refugee complained that the Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA) contravened his privacy rights by using commercial genetic genealogy (FamilyTreeDNA) to determine his nationality for deportation. He alleged lack of legal authority, unnecessary collection, invalid consent, deceptive practices, inadequate disclosure limitation, and insufficient Personal Information Bank (PIB) description. The Office of the Privacy Commissioner (OPC) found that while the collection was directly related to CBSA's program, the agency contravened section 5 of the Privacy Act by failing to obtain valid, informed authorization for indirect collection from FTDNA. CBSA also contravened section 8 by making incidental disclosures of the complainant's personal information to other FTDNA users, failing to monitor account settings, and not using a pseudonym. Furthermore, the CBSA's PIB descriptions were non-compliant with section 11, as they did not adequately describe the collection of genetic profiles of other FTDNA users. The OPC made several recommendations, which CBSA committed to implement for most parts, but two accounts remained open at the time of the report, leading to an ongoing, unresolved contravention. Consequently, the complaint was found well-founded in part and conditionally resolved in part.

• Whether CBSA's collection of genetic genealogy information was directly related to an operating program or activity under s.4 of the Privacy Act
• Whether CBSA collected unnecessary information under s.4 of the Privacy Act
• Whether CBSA obtained valid authorization from the complainant for the indirect collection of his personal information from FTDNA under s.5(1) of the Privacy Act
• Whether the complainant's consent for indirect collection was voluntary and not given under duress
• Whether the complainant was adequately informed about FTDNA's terms and his rights as a DNA donor for valid authorization
• Whether CBSA acted deceptively in its collection via FTDNA
• Whether the incidental indirect collection of genetic profile information of hundreds of other individuals contravened s.5(1) of the Privacy Act
• Whether CBSA's incidental disclosures of the complainant's personal information contravened s.8 of the Privacy Act
• Whether allowing potential disclosure of the complainant's personal information to other law enforcement bodies (via "law enforcement matching" opt-in) contravened s.8 of the Privacy Act
• Whether the disclosure of ancillary personal information (ethnicity) to genetic matches contravened s.8 of the Privacy Act
• Whether the disclosure of the complainant's identity to genetic matches (failure to use a pseudonym) contravened s.8 of the Privacy Act
• Whether CBSA's Personal Information Bank (PIB) descriptions complied with the transparency obligations under s.11 of the Privacy Act
• Whether the PIB adequately described the collection of biometric information for individuals subject to removal orders
• Whether the PIB adequately described the collection of genetic profiles of other FTDNA users (relatives of individuals subject to removal orders)

A complaint was filed against Correctional Service Canada (CSC) by the spouse of an employee, alleging inappropriate collection and disclosure of personal information from their public Facebook page. The information was collected by an assistant warden to investigate the employee's use of 'other leave with pay (699)' during the COVID-19 pandemic. The OPC found that significant portions of the collected information were not directly related to an operating program or activity of CSC, thus contravening Section 4 of the Privacy Act. The OPC also noted that the exclusion for publicly available information under subsection 69(2) of the Privacy Act applies only to use and disclosure, not collection. CSC subsequently deleted the collected screenshots and committed to developing guidance for managers on collecting information in a labour relations context. The complainant also raised concerns about CSC's internal complaint process, which CSC acknowledged was mishandled.

• Whether the collection of personal information from a public Facebook page was directly related to an operating program or activity of CSC under Section 4 of the Privacy Act
• Whether the exclusion for publicly available information under subsection 69(2) of the Privacy Act applies to the collection of personal information
• Whether the subsequent disclosure of the collected information was appropriate
• Whether CSC's internal process for handling privacy complaints from the public was adequate

The complainant alleged that Transport Canada improperly withheld information under subsection 19(1) and paragraph 20(1)(b) of the Access to Information Act, related to applications and Minimum Safe Manning Documents for the motor vessel Spirit of Vancouver Island. The complaint regarding subsection 19(1) was later removed from the investigation's scope. During the investigation, Transport Canada also applied paragraph 20(1)(b.1) to one document. The Commissioner found that while portions of one document met the requirements of paragraph 20(1)(b.1), the titles and headings did not. Furthermore, neither Transport Canada nor the third party provided sufficient representations to justify withholding information under paragraph 20(1)(b), except for the titles and headings of the document also claimed under 20(1)(b.1). The Commissioner ordered Transport Canada to disclose all information withheld under paragraphs 20(1)(b) and 20(1)(b.1), with the exception of the main content of page 50, and to disclose the titles and headings on page 50. Transport Canada indicated it would "likely" comply with the order.

• Whether s.19(1) personal information was properly withheld
• Whether s.20(1)(b) confidential third-party financial, commercial, scientific or technical information was properly withheld
• Whether s.20(1)(b.1) third-party emergency management plans information was properly withheld
• Whether the information concerned critical infrastructure information under s.20(1)(b.1)
• Whether the information was supplied in confidence under s.20(1)(b.1)
• Whether the information was supplied for the preparation, maintenance, testing or implementation of emergency management plans under s.20(1)(b.1)
• Whether Transport Canada reasonably exercised its discretion under s.20(5) regarding s.20(1)(b.1)
• Whether Transport Canada reasonably exercised its discretion under s.20(6) regarding s.20(1)(b.1)
• Whether the information was financial, commercial, scientific or technical under s.20(1)(b)
• Whether the information was confidential under s.20(1)(b)
• Whether the third party supplied the information to a government institution under s.20(1)(b)
• Whether the third party consistently treated the information as confidential under s.20(1)(b)

An employee of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (IRB) complained that their intimate personal and sensitive medical information, contained in a Fitness to Work (FTW) report, was disclosed to their management team without consent and for no reasonable purpose. The OPC investigated whether the IRB respected section 8 of the Privacy Act, specifically regarding consent and consistent use. The IRB argued the disclosure was a consistent use, but the OPC found that while some information disclosure was consistent, the highly intimate personal and sensitive medical information was not. The OPC concluded that the IRB contravened the Act by disclosing information internally that fell outside what is permissible. Despite some new processes, the IRB did not fully acknowledge wrongdoing or agree to all recommendations, leading to a well-founded and unresolved finding.

• Whether the IRB obtained valid consent for the disclosure of the FTW report to the management team under section 8(1) of the Privacy Act
• Whether the disclosure of intimate personal and sensitive medical information in the FTW report to the management team was a 'consistent use' under section 8(2)(a) of the Privacy Act
• Whether the IRB adhered to the Treasury Board Secretariat's Occupational Health Evaluation Standard regarding disclosure of medical information to employers

The complainant alleged that the Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) failed to conduct a reasonable search for records in response to two access requests. The requests sought electronic records related to masks, sent or received by a specific warehouse manager within defined timeframes. Initially, PHAC found no responsive records because the employee had deleted their entire mailbox, considering the contents transitory. During the OIC's investigation, PHAC conducted additional searches using IT forensics and identified 107 pages of responsive records, which were subsequently released. The Commissioner found that PHAC's initial search was inadequate as it did not consider other potential sources of records, such as emails sent to or from the employee by others, or corporate repositories. Despite the subsequent release of records and PHAC's commitment to an action plan for improved information management, the Commissioner concluded that the complaints were well founded due to the initial failure to conduct a reasonable search.

• Whether the Public Health Agency of Canada conducted a reasonable search for records in response to the first access request (5820-04413)
• Whether the Public Health Agency of Canada conducted a reasonable search for records in response to the second access request (5820-04414)
• Whether the deletion of an employee's email account impacted the ability to conduct a reasonable search
• Whether PHAC considered all reasonable sources for responsive records

The complainant alleged that Public Safety Canada (Public Safety) took an unreasonable extension of time to respond to an access request for correspondence between Public Safety and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). Public Safety claimed a 240-day extension under paragraphs 9(1)(a) and 9(1)(b) of the Access to Information Act. The Commissioner found that Public Safety properly notified the complainant of the extension. However, Public Safety failed to demonstrate that the request involved a large number of records or that processing it within 30 days would unreasonably interfere with its operations, thus not meeting the requirements of paragraph 9(1)(a). While Public Safety needed to consult with the RCMP, the Commissioner found the 180-day consultation period requested by the RCMP, based on service standards rather than complexity, to be unreasonable. Consequently, the Commissioner concluded that Public Safety did not meet the requirements for a valid extension under either paragraph 9(1)(a) or 9(1)(b), rendering the extension invalid. Public Safety was deemed to have refused access under subsection 10(3) of the Act.

• Whether the institution properly notified the complainant of the extension of time
• Whether the access request was for a large number of records under s.9(1)(a)
• Whether meeting the 30-day deadline would unreasonably interfere with the institution's operations under s.9(1)(a)
• Whether the institution needed to carry out consultations on the requested records under s.9(1)(b)
• Whether the consultations could reasonably be completed within 30 days under s.9(1)(b)
• Whether the extension of time was for a reasonable period under s.9(1)(b)
• Whether the institution responded within the time limits

The complainant alleged that Public Services and Procurement Canada (PSPC) failed to respond to an access request for records concerning the procurement of new handguns for the military within the 30-day statutory time limit. PSPC received the request on June 4, 2021, and the response was due by July 5, 2021, but no response was provided. PSPC cited a backlog, operational challenges, heavy workloads, staff turnover, and competing priorities as reasons for the delay, and indicated a plan to respond by February 28, 2025. The Commissioner found that PSPC's reasons, including staffing shortages and the need for inter-institutional consultations, did not absolve it of its statutory obligation to provide a timely response. The Commissioner concluded that PSPC failed to meet its obligations under the Act and was deemed to have refused access. The complaint was found to be well founded, and PSPC was ordered to provide a complete response within 36 business days, an order which PSPC indicated it would not fully implement.

• Whether the institution responded to the access request within the 30-day time limit set out in section 7 of the Access to Information Act
• Whether the institution's reasons for delay (backlog, operational challenges, staff turnover, competing priorities, inter-institutional consultations) absolved it of its statutory obligation to respond within the time limit

The complainant alleged that National Defence (DND) failed to respond to an access request within the 30-day statutory period, leading to a deemed refusal. The request sought records related to strategic communications campaigns concerning perceptions about drones. DND argued that the request did not meet the requirements of section 6 of the Access to Information Act, claiming it lacked sufficient detail to identify records with reasonable effort. The Information Commissioner found that the request, which included a timeframe and subject, provided sufficient detail for an experienced employee to identify the records. The Commissioner also rejected DND's arguments that parts of the request were hypothetical or related to external academic papers. Consequently, DND was found to be in a state of deemed refusal. The complaint was well founded, and DND was ordered to provide a complete response to the access request.

• Whether National Defence responded to the access request within the 30-day period set out in section 7 of the Act
• Whether the access request met the requirements of section 6 of the Act to provide sufficient detail to identify records with reasonable effort
• Whether the request for 'strategic communications campaign(s)' was too broad
• Whether parts of the request were related to a hypothetical strategic communications plan
• Whether parts of the request were related to an academic paper not available within DND/CAF