Canadian privacy & access decisions

The complainant alleged that Public Services and Procurement Canada (PSPC) took an unreasonable extension of time under subsection 9(1) of the Access to Information Act to respond to a request for documents related to parliamentary consideration of ArriveCAN. The OIC investigated two allegations: that the extension was unreasonable (s.30(1)(c)) and that it did not meet the requirements of section 9 (s.30(1)(a)). PSPC had extended the response time by 600 days under paragraph 9(1)(a) for volume of records and 150 days under paragraph 9(1)(b) for consultations. The OIC found that the extension under 9(1)(a) was reasonable due to the large volume of records and potential interference with operations. However, the OIC determined that the 150-day extension under 9(1)(b) was not reasonable because PSPC relied primarily on service standards rather than a genuine assessment of the actual time required for consultations. Consequently, the OIC concluded that PSPC was deemed to have refused access under subsection 10(3) and ordered PSPC to provide a complete response by June 1, 2026, also recommending interim releases for non-consultation documents. PSPC agreed to implement the order and recommendation.

• Whether the extension of time taken under subsection 9(1) was unreasonable (s.30(1)(c))
• Whether the extension of time taken met the requirements of section 9 (s.30(1)(a))
• Whether the request was for a large number of records under paragraph 9(1)(a)
• Whether meeting the 30-day deadline would unreasonably interfere with the institution’s operations under paragraph 9(1)(a)
• Whether the extension of time under paragraph 9(1)(a) was for a reasonable period
• Whether consultations were necessary under paragraph 9(1)(b)
• Whether consultations could reasonably be completed within 30 days under paragraph 9(1)(b)
• Whether the extension of time under paragraph 9(1)(b) was for a reasonable period
• Whether PSPC was deemed to have refused access pursuant to subsection 10(3)

An anonymous applicant complained that Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs Canada (CIRNAC) improperly withheld a 2000 land claim settlement agreement with the Squamish Nation. CIRNAC initially claimed exemptions under paragraphs 20(1)(b), 20(1)(c), and section 23 of the Access to Information Act, later adding paragraphs 18(b) and 20(1)(d) during the investigation. The Information Commissioner found that CIRNAC failed to demonstrate how any of the claimed exemptions applied to the records. Specifically, the institution did not establish a reasonable expectation of harm for the harms-based exemptions, nor did it meet all criteria for the class-based exemption. The Commissioner also rejected the argument that common law settlement privilege could be a stand-alone basis for refusal under the Act. Consequently, the complaint was found to be well-founded, and CIRNAC was ordered to disclose the records in their entirety. However, CIRNAC notified the Commissioner that it would not implement the order.

• Whether the information met the requirements of s.18(b) (competitive position or negotiations of a government institution)
• Whether the circumstances for exercising discretion under s.18(b) existed
• Whether the information met the requirements of s.20(1)(b) (confidential third-party financial, commercial, scientific or technical information)
• Whether the circumstances for exercising discretion under s.20(1)(b) existed
• Whether the information met the requirements of s.20(1)(c) (material financial impact on a third party or harm to its competitive position)
• Whether the circumstances for exercising discretion under s.20(1)(c) existed
• Whether the information met the requirements of s.20(1)(d) (interference with contractual or other negotiations of a third party)
• Whether the circumstances for exercising discretion under s.20(1)(d) existed
• Whether the information met the requirements of s.23 (solicitor-client or litigation privilege)
• Whether the circumstances for exercising discretion under s.23 existed
• Whether common law settlement privilege can be invoked as a stand-alone basis for refusing disclosure under the Access to Information Act
• Whether the public interest in access outweighed the public interest in preserving settlement privilege
• Whether CIRNAC fulfilled its severance obligations under s.25 of the Act