BreachOfPrivacy
Decisions/Federal (Canada)

Federal (Canada) Privacy Decisions

Browse privacy decisions from Federal (Canada) — with AI-generated plain-language summaries for every ruling.

5 decisions matching
Federal (Canada)Privacy ActWell-founded
Aug 16, 2017· Indexed Apr 12, 2026

Cell site simulators used by RCMP not capable of intercepting private communication

Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)

This investigation was initiated following a complaint that the RCMP used cell site simulators, also known as "Stingray" devices or "IMSI catchers," without confirming or denying their use. The complainant was concerned these devices could intercept private communications and extract encryption keys. The investigation found that while the RCMP's cell site simulators cannot intercept private communications, there were six instances where they were used without prior judicial authorization or exigent circumstances, which constituted a contravention of the Privacy Act. The RCMP has since implemented a policy requiring prior judicial authorization for all deployments unless exigent circumstances exist.

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Privacy ActWell-founded

Cell site simulators used by RCMP not capable of intercepting private communication

Aug 16, 2017
Adjudicator: Daniel Therrien
Plain-Language Summary

This investigation was initiated following a complaint that the RCMP used cell site simulators, also known as "Stingray" devices or "IMSI catchers," without confirming or denying their use. The complainant was concerned these devices could intercept private communications and extract encryption keys. The investigation found that while the RCMP's cell site simulators cannot intercept private communications, there were six instances where they were used without prior judicial authorization or exigent circumstances, which constituted a contravention of the Privacy Act. The RCMP has since implemented a policy requiring prior judicial authorization for all deployments unless exigent circumstances exist.

Key Issues
  • Use of cell site simulators (mobile device identifiers) by the RCMP
  • Capability of cell site simulators to intercept private communications
  • Requirement for judicial authorization for the collection of personal information using cell site simulators
  • Handling and retention of data collected from third-party devices
Federal (Canada)Privacy ActWell-founded
Jul 19, 2017· Indexed Apr 12, 2026

MyDemocracy website not designed in a privacy sensitive way

Privy Council Office (PCO)

The Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada (OPC) investigated a complaint regarding the MyDemocracy.ca website, operated by the Privy Council Office (PCO). The complainant alleged that despite promises of anonymity, the website used Facebook Connect tracking, potentially disclosing personal information to Facebook. The OPC found that the website's design led to the automatic disclosure of IP addresses and browser information to Facebook upon visiting the site, even before users chose to share content. While PCO made some changes and no evidence suggested PCO used the data to identify individuals, the OPC concluded that the initial disclosure was not consensual and violated section 8 of the Privacy Act. Consequently, the complaint was found well-founded.

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Privacy ActWell-founded

MyDemocracy website not designed in a privacy sensitive way

Jul 19, 2017
Adjudicator: Daniel Therrien
Plain-Language Summary

The Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada (OPC) investigated a complaint regarding the MyDemocracy.ca website, operated by the Privy Council Office (PCO). The complainant alleged that despite promises of anonymity, the website used Facebook Connect tracking, potentially disclosing personal information to Facebook. The OPC found that the website's design led to the automatic disclosure of IP addresses and browser information to Facebook upon visiting the site, even before users chose to share content. While PCO made some changes and no evidence suggested PCO used the data to identify individuals, the OPC concluded that the initial disclosure was not consensual and violated section 8 of the Privacy Act. Consequently, the complaint was found well-founded.

Key Issues
  • Disclosure of personal information to third parties (Facebook) without consent.
  • Whether IP addresses and browser characteristics constitute 'personal information' under the Privacy Act.
  • Adequacy of privacy notices and consent mechanisms for third-party data sharing.
  • Failure to conduct a Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA).
Federal (Canada)Privacy ActWell-founded
Jun 8, 2017· Indexed Apr 12, 2026

Over-collection of Personal Information of First Nations and Inuit people for the Administration of Non-Insured Health Benefits

Health Canada

The Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada (OPC) investigated a complaint that Health Canada was over-collecting personal information, specifically diagnostic details, for medical transportation and specialist services under its Non-Insured Health Benefits (NIHB) Program. The OPC found that while Health Canada's intention was to confirm policy requirements for travel, the form used inadvertently led to the collection of unnecessary diagnostic information. Health Canada has since removed the problematic field from the form.

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Privacy ActWell-founded

Over-collection of Personal Information of First Nations and Inuit people for the Administration of Non-Insured Health Benefits

Jun 8, 2017
Adjudicator: Daniel Therrien
Plain-Language Summary

The Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada (OPC) investigated a complaint that Health Canada was over-collecting personal information, specifically diagnostic details, for medical transportation and specialist services under its Non-Insured Health Benefits (NIHB) Program. The OPC found that while Health Canada's intention was to confirm policy requirements for travel, the form used inadvertently led to the collection of unnecessary diagnostic information. Health Canada has since removed the problematic field from the form.

Key Issues
  • Whether Health Canada collected more personal information than necessary for the administration of the NIHB Program.
  • Whether the collection of diagnostic information for medical transportation and specialist services contravened the Privacy Act.
  • The adequacy of Health Canada's NIHB Medical Transportation and Specialist Referral Form in preventing over-collection of personal information.
Federal (Canada)Privacy ActWell-founded
Jun 8, 2017· Indexed Apr 12, 2026

Phoenix pay system compromised Public Servants’ privacy

Public Services and Procurement Canada (PSPC)

The Office of the Privacy Commissioner (OPC) investigated three complaints concerning privacy breaches within the Phoenix pay system. The investigation revealed that Public Services and Procurement Canada (PSPC) had inadequate testing, coding errors, and insufficient controls, leading to multiple breaches of federal public servants' personal information. These breaches exposed names, Personal Record Identifier (PRI) numbers, and salary information, with some vulnerabilities being government-wide and potentially allowing data changes. The OPC found the complaints to be well-founded, citing the system's vulnerabilities and PSPC's initial underreporting of the scope of the breaches.

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Privacy ActWell-founded

Phoenix pay system compromised Public Servants’ privacy

Jun 8, 2017
Adjudicator: Daniel Therrien
Plain-Language Summary

The Office of the Privacy Commissioner (OPC) investigated three complaints concerning privacy breaches within the Phoenix pay system. The investigation revealed that Public Services and Procurement Canada (PSPC) had inadequate testing, coding errors, and insufficient controls, leading to multiple breaches of federal public servants' personal information. These breaches exposed names, Personal Record Identifier (PRI) numbers, and salary information, with some vulnerabilities being government-wide and potentially allowing data changes. The OPC found the complaints to be well-founded, citing the system's vulnerabilities and PSPC's initial underreporting of the scope of the breaches.

Key Issues
  • Unauthorized access to and disclosure of personal information within the Phoenix pay system.
  • Inadequacy of PSPC's testing, coding, and security controls for the Phoenix system.
  • Scope and impact of the privacy breaches on federal public servants.
  • Timeliness and adequacy of PSPC's notification to affected individuals.
Federal (Canada)Privacy ActWell-founded
Apr 19, 2017· Indexed Apr 12, 2026

Disclosure of information about complainant's attempted suicide to US Customs and Border Protection not authorized under the Privacy Act

Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)

This investigation concerned a complaint that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) inappropriately disclosed the complainant's personal information, including details of a past suicide attempt, to US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) via the Canadian Police Information Centre (CPIC). The complainant alleged this disclosure led to her being deemed inadmissible to the US. The Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada (OPC) found the disclosure was not authorized under the Privacy Act, as it did not meet the criteria for law enforcement or criminal justice purposes as defined by the Memorandum of Cooperation (MOC) between the RCMP and the FBI. Although the RCMP implemented some changes to CPIC policies, the OPC concluded they remained unclear and did not sufficiently protect against unauthorized disclosures.

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Privacy ActWell-founded

Disclosure of information about complainant's attempted suicide to US Customs and Border Protection not authorized under the Privacy Act

Apr 19, 2017
Adjudicator: Daniel Therrien
Plain-Language Summary

This investigation concerned a complaint that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) inappropriately disclosed the complainant's personal information, including details of a past suicide attempt, to US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) via the Canadian Police Information Centre (CPIC). The complainant alleged this disclosure led to her being deemed inadmissible to the US. The Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada (OPC) found the disclosure was not authorized under the Privacy Act, as it did not meet the criteria for law enforcement or criminal justice purposes as defined by the Memorandum of Cooperation (MOC) between the RCMP and the FBI. Although the RCMP implemented some changes to CPIC policies, the OPC concluded they remained unclear and did not sufficiently protect against unauthorized disclosures.

Key Issues
  • Whether the disclosure of personal information related to a suicide attempt to US border officials via CPIC was authorized under subsection 8(2)(f) of the Privacy Act.
  • Whether the disclosure was authorized under subsection 8(2)(a) of the Privacy Act as a use consistent with the original purpose of information collection.
  • Whether CPIC policies adequately protected against unauthorized disclosure of sensitive personal information.
  • The interpretation of 'law enforcement' and 'criminal justice purposes' in the context of border security assessments.