Canadian privacy & access decisions

The Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada (OPC) launched a Commissioner-initiated investigation (CII) into a privacy breach at WestJet that occurred on June 12, 2025. An unauthorized third party gained access to an employee's administrative account, bypassed multi-factor authentication, deployed ransomware, and exfiltrated data affecting approximately 5.1 million Canadian employees and customers. The breach exposed names, dates of birth, email addresses, mailing addresses, phone numbers, gender, travel booking information, and passport details, but no credit card numbers or SINs. WestJet took immediate containment measures, reported the breach, and provided direct and indirect notifications, credit monitoring, and identity theft protection services. WestJet has committed to further actions, including an external security assessment and providing a summary report to the OPC by August 7, 2026, to ensure the adequacy of its updated security safeguards and prevent future breaches. The CII will be discontinued upon the Commissioner being satisfied that WestJet has fulfilled all commitments.

• Adequacy of security safeguards under PIPEDA
• Adequacy of notifications to affected individuals under PIPEDA
• Whether WestJet's post-breach remediation actions and future commitments provide a fair and reasonable response to the incident

The Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada (OPC) initiated complaints against X Corp. and X.AI LLC following reports that their AI chatbot, Grok, generated millions of sexualized deepfakes of identifiable individuals. The investigation focused on whether valid consent was obtained for the collection, use, and disclosure of personal information for this purpose, and if such practices were appropriate under PIPEDA. The OPC found that neither company obtained valid consent, noting the sensitive nature of the information, the unreasonableness of individuals' expectations, and the significant risk of harm. Furthermore, the OPC concluded that the generation of sexualized deepfakes was inappropriate, as the loss of privacy and harm far outweighed any benefits, and less privacy-invasive means were available. While the companies implemented some safeguards, the OPC deemed their initial response insufficient and their current measures unproven. Consequently, the matter was found well-founded, with the OPC making several recommendations for improved safeguards, proactive monitoring, and annual third-party audits, while committing to ongoing monitoring.

• Whether PIPEDA applies to X Corp. and X.AI LLC, specifically regarding the existence of a "real and substantial connection" to Canada.
• Whether deepfakes of identifiable individuals, including sexualized deepfakes, constitute "personal information" under PIPEDA.
• Whether X Corp. and X.AI LLC obtained valid consent for the collection, use, and disclosure of personal information to generate sexualized deepfakes, as required by Principle 4.3 of PIPEDA.
• Whether express consent was required for the generation of sexualized deepfakes, considering the sensitivity of the information, individuals' reasonable expectations, and the risk of significant harm (Principle 4.3.4, 4.3.5, and s.6.1 of PIPEDA).
• Whether X Corp. and X.AI LLC are accountable for ensuring valid consent for content generated by their tools in the course of commercial activity.
• Whether a reasonable person would consider the collection, use, and disclosure of personal information for the purpose of an image generation service capable of producing sexualized deepfakes to be appropriate in the circumstances, as per subsection 5(3) of PIPEDA.
• Whether the organizations had a legitimate need or bona fide business interest that extended to providing an image generation tool capable of producing non-consensual sexualized deepfakes.
• Whether less privacy-invasive means were available to achieve the organizations' purposes at comparable cost and benefits.
• Whether the loss of privacy and risk of harm associated with sexualized deepfakes were proportionate to the benefits of the practice.
• Whether X Corp. and X.AI LLC's initial response and implemented safeguards were sufficient and effective in preventing the generation of sexualized deepfakes.

The Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada (OPC) launched a systemic investigation into the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) following media reports and a complaint regarding widespread unauthorized disclosures and modifications of taxpayer personal information. The investigation, a Special Report to Parliament, examined whether the CRA had adequate safeguards to protect taxpayer data from identity theft and fraudulent activities. The OPC found that the CRA contravened subsections 6(2) and 8(2) of the Privacy Act due to shortcomings in its prevention, monitoring, detection, remediation, and governance practices. While acknowledging the CRA's efforts to improve its security posture, the OPC identified specific weaknesses, such as delayed implementation of mandatory multi-factor authentication (MFA) and insufficient tracking of individual breaches. The OPC issued nine recommendations to the CRA, covering areas like strengthening MFA, enhancing phone authentication, adopting zero-trust principles, improving attack surface management, and refining breach tracking and governance. The CRA accepted eight recommendations in full and one in part, leading to a "well-founded and conditionally resolved" outcome.

• Whether the CRA adequately protected personal information against unauthorized disclosure and modification
• Whether the CRA contravened subsection 6(2) of the Privacy Act regarding accuracy of personal information
• Whether the CRA contravened subsection 8(2) of the Privacy Act regarding disclosure of personal information
• Whether the CRA's prevention measures were adequate
• Whether the CRA implemented mandatory multi-factor authentication (MFA) in a timely manner and with sufficient strength
• Whether the CRA's authentication processes by phone were strong enough
• Whether the CRA considered and integrated a zero-trust approach into its security measures
• Whether the CRA had sufficient visibility over its attack surface and managed it effectively
• Whether the CRA's vetting, training, and awareness tools were effective for employees and third parties
• Whether the CRA's monitoring and detection approach was tailored to the threats and risks leading to Unauthorized Use of Taxpayer Information by a Third Party (UUTP)
• Whether the CRA's remediation efforts for individual UUTPs were adequate, including root cause analysis
• Whether the CRA's governance processes for addressing UUTPs were coordinated, comprehensive, and efficient

This joint investigation by the OPC, CAI, OIPC-BC, and OIPC-AB examined OpenAI OpCo, LLC's compliance with federal and provincial privacy laws regarding its ChatGPT service. The Offices investigated OpenAI's collection, use, and disclosure of personal information for model training, consent practices, openness, accuracy, individual rights (access, correction, deletion), data retention, and accountability. While OpenAI challenged jurisdiction and argued for implied consent, the Offices largely found contraventions in its initial practices, particularly concerning the overbroad collection of personal information from public sources and user interactions without valid consent or sufficient transparency. However, in response to the preliminary report, OpenAI committed to implementing significant privacy-enhancing measures, including a new filtering tool for training data, improved transparency, and enhanced individual rights processes. Consequently, the OPC found the matter well-founded and conditionally resolved under PIPEDA, expecting continued implementation and improvement of these measures. The OIPC-AB and OIPC-BC, due to stricter provincial consent requirements, found the consent issues well-founded and unresolved, while the CAI had mixed outcomes, also finding some issues unresolved. The Offices will monitor OpenAI's implementation of the agreed-upon recommendations.

• Whether the Offices had jurisdiction over OpenAI's activities under federal and provincial privacy laws.
• Whether OpenAI collected, used, and disclosed personal information for purposes that a reasonable person would consider appropriate in the circumstances.
• Whether OpenAI obtained valid consent for the collection and use of personal information from publicly accessible websites and licensed third-party sources for model training.
• Whether OpenAI obtained valid consent and met its obligation to inform individuals with respect to the collection and use of personal information included in their interactions with ChatGPT.
• Whether OpenAI obtained valid consent and met its obligation to inform individuals with respect to the disclosure of personal information collected from various sources via ChatGPT.
• Whether OpenAI was sufficiently open and transparent about its models and information handling practices.
• Whether OpenAI took reasonable steps to ensure that the information it generates about individuals is as accurate, complete, and up-to-date as is necessary for the purposes for which it is to be used.
• Whether OpenAI provided individuals with the ability to obtain access to their personal information.
• Whether OpenAI provided individuals with the ability to correct their personal information.
• Whether OpenAI provided individuals with the ability to remove/delete their personal information from its models.
• Whether OpenAI established appropriate retention and disposal procedures for the personal information that it collects, uses, and discloses.
• Whether OpenAI met its accountability requirements in respect of the personal information under its control.
• Whether the personal or domestic purposes exemption applied to OpenAI's commercial activities.
• Whether the publicly available information exception applied to OpenAI's collection of personal information from the Internet.
• Whether the journalistic, historical, or genealogical material exception under Quebec's Private Sector Act applied to OpenAI's model training data.
• Whether section 9.1 of Quebec's Private Sector Act (privacy by default) applied to ChatGPT's privacy settings.

The Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada (OPC) investigated the Canada Border Services Agency's (CBSA) contracting practices for the ArriveCAN application, focusing on measures to protect travellers' personal information handled by contractors. An individual's complaint and a parliamentary committee's motion prompted the review into whether contractors accessed personal information without required security clearances, potentially contravening sections 7 and 8 of the Privacy Act. The OPC found that while contracts included appropriate security clauses, there were issues with the accuracy and timeliness of security assessments (SRCLs) and overly broad task descriptions in Task Authorizations (TAs). Although vendors met organizational security requirements, one contractor worked for 18 months with an expired security clearance, exposing the CBSA to increased privacy risks. The CBSA implemented adequate administrative and technical safeguards, such as segregated environments and strict access controls, but six contractors were granted access to personal information not strictly necessary for their duties. Despite these shortcomings, the investigation found no evidence that personal information was actually used or disclosed in contravention of the Act. Consequently, the complaint was found to be not well-founded, but the OPC issued recommendations to the CBSA to strengthen its contracting and privacy practices, which the agency accepted.

• Whether the CBSA authorized contractors to access personal information collected through ArriveCAN without the required security clearance, in contravention of sections 7 and 8 of the Privacy Act
• Whether ArriveCAN contracts and Task Authorizations (TAs) contained appropriate clauses to ensure the protection of travellers’ personal information that contractors had access to
• Whether security requirements identified in contracts and TAs were accurate and specific
• Whether the CBSA complied with organizational security screening requirements for vendors
• Whether the CBSA complied with personnel security screening requirements for contractors
• Whether the CBSA implemented adequate administrative safeguards to protect personal information accessed by contractors
• Whether the CBSA implemented adequate technical safeguards to protect personal information accessed by contractors
• Whether the CBSA restricted contractor permissions and access to personal information to what was strictly necessary