Canadian privacy & access decisions

An individual complained that a private swimming pool required parents to consent to the use of their children's photos and videos for promotional purposes as a condition of service for swimming lessons. The complainant argued this violated PIPEDA's consent requirements, specifically Principle 4.3.3, which prohibits requiring consent for information beyond what is necessary for the service. The swimming pool contended that the photo policy was a reasonable business need for promotion and staff training, and that tracking individual consent would be burdensome. The OPC found that images of children in swim attire are sensitive personal information and that requiring consent for promotional photos and staff training videos was not strictly necessary for providing swimming lessons. The OPC concluded that this practice contravened PIPEDA Principles 4.3.3 and 4.3.6. The complaint was found to be well-founded and resolved after the swimming pool agreed to implement an opt-in photo policy.

• Whether requiring consent for promotional photos and videos of children as a condition of service for swimming lessons contravenes Principle 4.3.3 of PIPEDA
• Whether images of children in swim attire constitute sensitive personal information
• Whether the collection, use, or disclosure of images for promotional or staff training purposes is strictly necessary for the provision of swimming lessons
• Whether the organization offered individuals a choice regarding the collection, use, or disclosure of images for promotional or staff training purposes
• Whether the organization should have sought express consent for the collection, use, or disclosure of images of children

The Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada (OPC) and the UK Information Commissioner (ICO) jointly investigated a data breach at 23andMe Inc., a direct-to-consumer genetic testing company, which affected almost 7 million customers globally, including 319,000 in Canada. The investigation focused on the adequacy of 23andMe's security safeguards and its breach notification practices following a credential stuffing attack. The OPC found that 23andMe failed to implement appropriate safeguards, such as mandatory multi-factor authentication, robust compromised-password checks, and effective detection systems, given the highly sensitive nature of genetic and health information. Additionally, 23andMe's breach notifications to the OPC and affected individuals were deemed inadequate in content and timing, as they initially omitted crucial details like raw DNA data compromise and the data being offered for sale. However, 23andMe subsequently implemented significant security enhancements and updated its notification processes. Consequently, the OPC concluded both issues were well-founded but resolved due to the satisfactory corrective measures taken by the company. This report also highlighted the ongoing bankruptcy proceedings of 23andMe and the Commissioners' commitment to ensuring privacy obligations are met if customer data is transferred.

• Whether 23andMe had appropriate safeguards to protect highly sensitive personal information under its control, specifically against credential stuffing attacks.
• Whether 23andMe's prevention measures, including mandatory Multi-factor Authentication (MFA), compromised-password checks, and minimum password requirements, were adequate.
• Whether 23andMe's detection measures, including detection systems, digital fingerprinting, and device history, were adequate to identify ongoing attacks.
• Whether 23andMe adequately investigated anomalies and claims of breach prior to public disclosure.
• Whether 23andMe's breach response, including the timeliness of disabling active user sessions, disabling raw DNA download features, and implementing mandatory MFA, was adequate.
• Whether 23andMe adequately notified the OPC about the breach, including the completeness of information provided and timeliness.
• Whether 23andMe adequately notified affected individuals about the breach, including the completeness of information provided and timeliness.
• Whether the data breach created a real risk of significant harm to affected individuals, triggering notification obligations.
• Whether 23andMe's methodology for identifying and notifying individuals whose raw DNA was downloaded by the Threat Actor was adequate.