Federal (Canada) privacy & access decisions

The OPC initiated an investigation into CashHere, a short-term lender, after being alerted by the Ontario Ministry of Government and Consumer Services that it was collecting online banking credentials (passwords, usernames, security questions/answers) from loan applicants. The OPC found that while CashHere had a legitimate need to validate identity and income, collecting banking credentials was not an appropriate purpose under PIPEDA s. 5(3) due to less privacy-invasive alternatives and disproportionate privacy risks. The investigation also noted that a related entity, MoneyHome, appeared to be continuing the same practices. CashHere ceased responding to the OPC, and the matter was found to be well-founded and unresolved.

• Whether CashHere's collection of online banking login credentials was for a purpose that a reasonable person would consider appropriate under s. 5(3) of PIPEDA
• Whether the collection of banking credentials was effective in meeting CashHere's legitimate need
• Whether there were less privacy-invasive means of achieving the same ends
• Whether the loss of privacy was proportional to the benefits for CashHere

A joint investigation by Canadian privacy commissioners examined Clearview AI's facial recognition tool, which scraped billions of images from public websites to create a database for law enforcement and other users. Clearview argued that Canadian privacy laws did not apply due to a lack of jurisdiction and that the information was "publicly available," thus exempt from consent requirements. The Offices asserted jurisdiction, finding a real and substantial connection to Canada through Clearview's marketing and use by Canadian entities. They determined Clearview failed to obtain requisite consent, as the "publicly available" exception did not apply to sensitive biometric data scraped from social media for unrelated purposes. Furthermore, Clearview's mass collection and use of sensitive facial biometric information for commercial purposes were deemed inappropriate. In Quebec, Clearview also failed to report its biometric database and obtain express consent as required by law. The matter was found to be well-founded, with recommendations for Clearview to cease operations in Canada and delete Canadian data, which Clearview did not commit to implementing.

• Whether the Canadian privacy commissioners had jurisdiction over Clearview AI's activities.
• Whether Clearview AI obtained requisite consent for its collection, use, and disclosure of personal information under PIPEDA, PIPA AB, PIPA BC, and Quebec's Private Sector Act.
• Whether the "publicly available" information exception applied to Clearview AI's collection of images from public websites.
• Whether Clearview AI's collection, use, and disclosure of personal information was for an appropriate purpose under PIPEDA, PIPA AB, PIPA BC, and Quebec's Private Sector Act.
• Whether Clearview AI satisfied its biometric obligations in Quebec, specifically regarding reporting the creation of a biometric database and obtaining express consent under the LCCJTI.
• Whether Clearview AI's activities were protected by freedom of expression under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.